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 Abstract 
Globalization has generated increased societal heterogeneity and awakened interest of 
a new kind in social cohesion and integration. But globalization is not the only 
contemporary process to give rise to societal hybridization. Two other such processes—
much less attended to in the theoretical debate but no less problematic as regards 
social integration—are societal ageing and robotization. Drawing on statistical 
estimates, this paper begins by assessing the relevance of these new processes of 
hybridization. The predictions in question indicate that in the near future, everyday 
interaction, not just with cultural strangers and ‘intelligent’ machines, but also with 
people suffering from dementia, will be an omnipresent phenomenon, confronting our 
societies with types and degrees of alterity never before encountered. Whereas 
contact with cultural strangers is to some extent familiar (though not yet taken as 
standard), interaction with intelligent technological devices and dementia sufferers 
represent new forms of alterity for which most societies have not yet established 
routines of conduct. This paper gives a detailed account of a number of empirical 
studies showing how new forms of hybrid interaction and cooperation evolve out of 
repeated contact with each of the three alterities. With this groundwork in place, the 
paper then attempts to identify not only the ways in which routines may develop out of 
interaction with the three alterities but also the trends towards, and prerequisites for, 
the emergence of a new culture of cooperation and interaction. 
Keywords  
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New Alterities and Emerging Cultures 
of Social Interaction1 
 
 
Christian Meyer 
Introduction 
In recent decades, social and cultural hybridity2 have increasingly been perceived 
as topics of relevance—practical as well as theoretical—for many of the world’s 
societies and at different levels of social reality ranging from global cooperation to 
situated social interaction. That we live in a ‘world in creolization’ has become a 
commonplace (Hannerz 1987). Concerns about the progressive disintegration and 
fragmentation of (world) society as a result of cultural hybridization and 
globalization have prompted a new scientific interest in (ultimately Durkheimian3) 
questions of social cohesion and integration. 
To be sure, local communities, emerging urban centres, national societies, and—
most recently—transnational formations have always been confronted with the 
challenge of absorbing, integrating, and assimilating persons, practices, and 
phenomena from the outside. Migrants and displaced people from adjacent rural 
areas, remote territories, and unknown lands have always had to be integrated into 
the resident community in some way or other, and this is still the case. As a rule, 
societies have developed routines for the business of daily cohabitation with 
cultural strangers, and for their integration and (sometimes) assimilation—though 
these practices have certainly not occurred without conflict, rejection, and 
segregation. 
																																																								
 1  The author is grateful for generous support by the Centre for Global Cooperation Research 
(Käte Hamburger Kolleg) at the University of Duisburg-Essen in the form of a senior 
fellowship that made research for this paper possible. I thank the three commentators for 
their close reading and valuable interpretations of this text. Furthermore, I thank Claus 
Leggewie, Erhard Schüttpelz, Alexandra Przyrembel and Christine Unrau for helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am also grateful for valuable discussions at the 
colloquium of the Centre for Global Cooperation Research, the department of sociology of 
the University of Duisburg-Essen and the department of sociology at the University of 
Erlangen-Nürnberg where I presented parts of this paper. Finally, I would like to thank 
Margaret Clarke and Martin Wolf for their editorial support. 
 2  Hybridity is used here as an umbrella-term covering a number of metaphors of cultural 
mixture such as ‘creolization’, ‘syncretism’, and ‘melting’ (Stewart 1999, 2011). Here, it refers 
mostly to the increased cohabitation of divergent and internally heterogeneous socio-cultural 
communities, their intensified interaction, and their mutual acceptance of meanings, objects, 
and practices (Burke 2009, esp. 21–33). 
 3  Durkheim’s academic work was driven by a desire to counter the signs of disintegration he 
was witnessing by calling into service the new science that he and others were establishing 
under the name of ‘sociology’.  See e.g. Durkheim 1897. 
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Sustained by new and ever swifter modes of communication and transport, 
processes of societal hybridization have gained further momentum in the twenty-
first century, increasing in dynamics and scope. As on many previous occasions in 
the past, this has brought about massive changes in our modes of conviviality in 
world society.4 
However, while cultural hybridization resulting from fluxes in immigration is a 
well-known phenomenon—albeit one with notorious concomitant problems—and 
builds on older, well-established ways of dealing with difference, new and still 
unfamiliar types of hybridization are on the increase, and some forms of 
hybridization are emerging that have no precedent at all in human history. 
Amongst the processes involved here are, on the one hand, societal ageing, which 
is currently resulting in the presence of an unprecedentedly large proportion of 
dementia sufferers in society, and, on the other, technological advances that make 
it possible—or will shortly do so—to generate artificial personas endowed with 
interactional abilities and ever less trivial levels of intelligence. At the moment, 
these processes are at their most dynamic in Western societies and Japan, but they 
are beginning to extend to other areas of the world as well. 
Confronting us as they do with basic questions about what it means to be human, 
these processes throw up a series of important social challenges, in the form, for 
example, of changes in the definition of human rights, the age of majority, the 
general concept of rights and duties, the franchise, and, more generally, changes in 
mechanisms of social inclusion and coherence. In this paper, I will focus on just one 
aspect of these changes, namely emerging modes of social interaction triggered by 
the intensified but normalized presence of established alterities and alterities that 
are likely to emerge in the future.5 This will provide us with insights into the nature 
of changes at the more general level. 
This paper is inspired by the perception that human societies have so far not 
invented any stable social routines for dealing with socio-cultural strangers as 
standard counterparts in social interaction rather than as puzzling exceptions. We 
are even less well equipped when it comes to routinized, well-established 
procedures for dealing, on a regular basis, with dementia sufferers, virtual agents, 
and robots. And yet, not only do we already routinely encounter cultural strangers 
from the remotest parts of the world; we will very soon have to deal on a recurrent 
basis with cognitively impaired counterparts and with virtual agents and robots 
that are able to simulate ever more refined social presences. These new alterities 
call for the development of new social and interactional routines appropriate to 
their respective particularities. New types of societal hybridization—as we shall see 
																																																								
 4 This is not to say that I adhere, as does Rosa (2009, 2013), for example, to the hypothesis that 
we are currently witnessing a general acceleration in the temporal culture of human societies 
(or that this, as it were, represents a feature of late modern societies). 
 5 The notion of alterity is used here in a general sense that includes otherness as well as 
strangeness. In the literature, however, a distinction is sometimes made between, on the one 
hand, alterity in the sense either of a different but similar other (bearing what Wittgenstein 
called ‘family resemblance’) or of a comparable other (meaning an entity available for the 
creation of analogies but not of identities—as illustrated by Thomas Nagel (1974) in his ‘bat’ 
gedankenexperiment) and, on the other, alterity in the sense of alienity, as embodied in the 
inconceivable and incommensurable stranger (Turk 1990). I am also aware that the emphasis 
on difference inherent to the concept of alterity brings with it the risk of itself causing the 
othering of the other in the first place. 
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in greater detail below—inexorably trigger, dictate the practical implementation 
of, and, in the not-too-distant future, will certainly be embodied in, new modes and 
cultures of social interaction in our daily life. 
In the title of this paper, I speak of new cultures of social interaction. I do so 
because the new ways of dealing with the upcoming alterities will touch on a wide 
range of aspects of social and cultural life, and will result in new practices. At some 
point, these practices will then be conventionalized, crystallized in new routines 
encompassing core assumptions of an implicit, tacit kind—which will then no longer 
have to be made explicit. From then on, the new cultures will embrace—as does 
culture in general—temporally and syntactically organized embodied practices, 
semantic associations, and attributions of meaning, and will be represented in all 
kinds of material objectivations.6 Hence, culture is here conceived of not as a 
homogeneous entity or a container comprehending either meanings or people 
(depending on one’s theoretical preference), but rather as an internally coherent 
collection of communicatory processes and resources that enable, constitute, and 
organize the sociality and socialization of a species that is endowed with the ability 
to depart from nature.7 Since they inevitably create experiences of difference in 
relation to an alter whose consciousness is principally inaccessible (Schütz 1962; 
Nagel 1974), these processes of, and resources for, communication are 
fundamental to the constitution of reflexivity—which, in the end, forms the most 
elementary constituent of culture. In addition, by conceiving culture from its 
margins, from liminal socialities, from hybridities and in-betweens (or, as it were, 
through border-thinking), the present paper contributes to the reflexive project of 
getting us to enlighten ourselves about—and thus relativize—its basic, often tacit, 
assumptions.8 If this reversal of perspectives entails an othering of the unfamiliar 
(Fabian 1983), it equally implies an othering of the self, since it mirrors basic 
dimensions of our self-conceptions. 
As I will argue, the societal generalization of close contacts with hybrid and 
liminal modes of social existence also necessitates a revision of conceptions of 
humanity and of the person. Conceptions deriving from the Enlightenment have 
been particularly influential in causing us to restrict our view too narrowly to 
cognitive-mnemonic, anthropic, and putatively rational but—as will be shown 
here—highly culture-bound aspects of the social person (Welsch 2011, 2012a, 
2012b; Welsch, Singer and Wunder 2011). That said, concepts of the person have 
proved variable—not only culturally but also historically—ever since the relevant 
lexeme (‘persona’) emerged in Antiquity (Mauss 1938/1985; Joas 2011). 
Old and New Forms of Alterity 
Human societies have been dealing with alterities of all kinds and degrees for a 
very long time. Examples include interaction with ancestors, spirits, and gods, the 
																																																								
 6 For a more detailed account of the concept of culture used here, see Girke and Meyer 2011. 
 7 See Hansen 1995, who defines culture as ‘the sum of difference’. 
 8 On cultural differences and hybridization in general, see Santiago 2001, Mignolo 2000, Young 
1995, Bhabha 1994. 
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breeding of animals, and child-rearing.9 Fundamental changes can also be 
documented in the cultures of interaction with each of these alterities—for 
example in regard to new transcendental practices,10 intensified relationships with 
pets11 in a society marked by isolation and loneliness and in therapeutic 
environments,12 and new cultures of child-rearing in low-birth-rate societies.13 
These changes certainly merit more detailed investigation but are not addressed in 
this paper. 
Instead, I shall here consider three processes of social change, with a view to 
identifying some of the foreseeable features and emergent routines that will 
characterize future cultures of social interaction—and some of the problems that 
may be associated with them: 
1. The normalization of socio-cultural difference brought about by 
globalization and the resultant increase in the number and density of 
interactions occurring under conditions of socio-cultural alterity; 
2. Robotization and the proliferation in interactions occurring under 
conditions of socio-technical difference; 
3. Societal ageing (and resultant ‘alzheimerization’) and the increase in 
the number of interactions characterized by socio-cognitive 
difference. 
Besides challenging global society in numerous practical and ethical ways, each of 
these processes calls into question some of the basic theoretical assumptions of 
the social sciences. This comes about because the normalization of social relations 
with socio-cultural, socio-technical, and socio-cognitive strangers creates a need for 
a new discussion about the nature of the social world and what is conventionally 
called—and has recently increasingly been debated under the label of—‘social 
ontology’.14 Are cultural strangers, robots, virtual agents, and people with 
dementia part of the social world? Are they part of society? Can we speak of an 
interaction with them in any strong sense? In other words, are we able to establish 
																																																								
 9 See e.g. Singleton 2009, Meyer 2010, Trevarthen 1998, Otterstedt and Rosenberger 2009, 
Sanders 2003, Pedersen and Fields 2009. On cognitively impaired persons, see Coulter 1973 
(esp. 152 ff.), Pollner and McDonald-Wikler 1985. 
 10 Prayer, for example, or transcendental experiences in meditation. 
 11 As substitutes for friends or partners, for example. 
 12 As counterparts that will provide emotional stimulation or have a calming or consoling effect. 
 13 These include treating children as already fully competent counterparts and legal persons 
who no longer require any kind of child-rearing framework. 
 14 Social ontologies are debated from a number of viewpoints. They may be considered in 
relation to the level at which the term ‘society’ may be applied to an entity. In other words: is 
the social constituted, as claimed in methodological individualism, by the aggregation of its 
constituent elements, i.e. individuals; or is it, as assumed by methodological collectivism, an 
emergent reality consisting of more than the sum of its parts. They may also be considered in 
relation to the fringes and boundaries of the social world and which entities are to be 
included in the social. The post-Enlightenment assumption that society consists (only) of 
humans has recently been challenged. There have been calls for objects and artefacts to be 
included; discussions have taken shape around the subject of comatose and brain-dead 
patients; and demands have been made for human rights to be extended to include members 
of the great-ape family. See Gittler 1951 for one of the earliest occurrences of the term ‘social 
ontology’; and for a good overview of recent debates in the philosophical domain, see Schmid 
2009. 
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an ‘I and Thou’ relationship, a ‘We’, a real mutuality with them? Or should we 
instead speak—in an instrumental sense—of mere contact and communication 
with them, of care-taking in the case of the elderly and of handling and operation in 
the case of technical devices?15 
In sum, this paper focuses on one particular aspect of these forthcoming social 
changes, namely how our practices of social interaction—in relation to each of the 
processes individually, but also to their interplay—may change in the medium term 
as a result of the new alterities. It also asks what impact the normalization of 
interactions and relationships with new alterities will have on sociological concepts 
and models. 
From a methodological point of view, two general approaches to the study of 
interactional processes under conditions of alterity may be distinguished.16 The 
first consists in eliciting from actors whether or not they attribute properties of 
interactivity to their contact with the stranger in question. The second focuses on 
the observation of naturally occurring processes of interaction and analyses them 
in regard to visible modes of interactivity. The two approaches differ in terms of 
their analytical value. Because it focuses on the experiences and subjective 
perspectives of the actors, the first approach does not generate independent 
assessments of the extent to which interaction happens and whether the different 
types of alter should be considered part of the social world in a general sense. In 
this approach, the risk that projection by the actors will be treated as fact is 
considerable. Third-party validation of the actors’ interpretations therefore seems 
a sensible step here (Lindemann 2005). 
Although the second approach may be able to reconstruct whether interaction—
in the sense of a mutual relatedness—has occurred, it has no methodological 
access to the sometimes surprising, and perspective-broadening, viewpoints of the 
actors. It must therefore be particularly careful to reflect on its descriptive and 
analytical categories, in order to avoid merely sustaining pre-existing criteria 
through the data. However, given that a third party—namely the researcher—
assesses interactivity at the outset, analysis here extends beyond the subjective 
perceptions (and potential projections) of the actors. In this approach, interactivity 
is evaluated through the identification of sequentially produced conversational 
turns, and speech and action moves, in recordings of naturally occurring interaction 
(Schegloff 1992). 
In this paper, I apply the second approach and analyse existing evidence-based 
studies on interactions with the three selected alterities. This empirical approach 
precludes any a priori assumptions about the existence of interactivity with the 
three liminal social beings17 and any possibility of turning out simplified ‘thin 
descriptions’ of interactions between humans and marginal social entities that 
merely shift the language of description instead of providing thorough analyses.18 
 
																																																								
 15 On the question of whether we can talk of interacting with things, see Owens 2007, Dant 
2004, Rossiter 2007. 
 16 On the same distinction in relation to interaction with technological devices, see Rammert 
and Schulz-Schaeffer 2002, esp. 23 ff. 
 17 As does Luckmann (1970) with his theorem of ‘universal projection’. 
 18 As does actor-network theory with its ‘symmetrical anthropology’ (Callon 1986; Latour 1991). 
Meyer: New Alterities and Emerging Cultures of Social Interaction 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 3 10 
	
I will begin by outlining the three processes in question in terms of general trends 
drawn partly from statistical evidence and partly from qualitative and quantitative 
projections. This will put us in a position to assess the extent to which we will be 
confronted with each of the alterities. 
Globalization: The Generalization of Socio-cultural Difference 
As I have mentioned, contact with cultural strangers has been a conditio humana 
since the emergence of human communities. However, as we shall see, a qualitative 
change is about to occur that will shift the perception of interactions with cultural 
strangers from that of a puzzling and potentially disconcerting exception to that of 
a standard and routinized everyday experience. 
Today, our everyday experiences teach us that globalization has reached a level 
where it affects our own personal and social contacts. We may ourselves have a 
migratory background,19 or have direct relatives who do; but even if not, we will 
encounter and deal with persons of different socio-cultural background in 
numerous areas of professional and personal life.20 Thus globalization 
encompasses not only economic, political, and institutional integration but also an 
increasing density of social interaction under conditions of socio-cultural 
difference.21 
The strongest indicators of interactional globalization are probably international 
migratory flows and tourism—corroborated by the current number and length of 
international telephone-calls, which are probably a result of them. These indicators 
																																																								
 19 In 2009, this was true of 15.7 million people in Germany—nearly 20% of the population; in 
2030 the figure will be between 40% and 45%. 
 20 Many of us have lived in foreign countries or work in international corporations or 
organizations where personal contact with people from abroad is part of the job. Even where 
none of this applies, we will probably have got to know people from different socio-cultural 
backgrounds through tourism, which gives us easy access to the remotest areas of the world. 
In addition, media technologies have made it easy for us to interact and communicate with 
people in distant countries using networks such as Facebook (1.5 billion members from all 
over the world, of whom 1 billion are active on a monthly basis and 684 million on a daily 
basis), chat rooms and virtual worlds such as (to name but two) Second Life (28 million 
members, of whom 1.5 million are regular users) and World of Warcraft (10 million paid-up 
members). Telephone statistics also reflect this intensification in contact. International 
phone-subscriptions more than doubled between 2005 and 2011 and international voice-
traffic in 2002 was almost double that in 1997, prior to the shift to Internet technology. After 
this shift, between 1999 and 2007, the worldwide volume of traffic in bits per person per 
second underwent a 150-fold growth. See http://www.econstats.com, accessed 2 July 2013. 
 21 There are a number of indicators of globalization that include this kind of personal and 
interactional globalization. The KOF index, compiled by the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology (ETH), records country-specific figures for international phone-traffic, 
international money-transfers, tourism, numbers of foreigners in the population, and 
numbers of letters sent abroad (Dreher, Gaston and Martens 2008) In the original 1970 index, 
Germany scored 32 points; by 2004 this figure had grown to 58. In 2012, it was ranked 22nd; 
Belgium; Ireland, and the Netherlands occupied the first three positions, with Greece and Italy 
ranking directly behind Germany. 
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tell us, for example, that tourism has more than doubled since 1995.22 In addition, 
international student-migration has quadrupled since 197523 and the production of 
internationally co-authored scientific papers has increased six-fold since 1985.24 
In Germany, there has been a new growth in labour immigration since 2010 and 
the migratory balance is now positive again. Whereas the percentage of foreign 
nationals in Germany was 8.5 (7 million) in 2011, estimates predict 17 per cent (13 
million) for 2030 in a medium-term migratory scenario. ‘The population in Germany 
has become more heterogeneous, and this trend will continue,’ says the German 
government in its 2011 Demography Report (Bundesministerium des Innern 2011: 
12). Whereas, for example, there are currently only 4 million Muslims living in 
Germany, by 2030 the figure will be about 5.5 million, amongst an overall 
population that will have shrunk from today’s 82 million to only 78 million. 
There is no doubt that all these trends are resulting in the growth, intensification, 
and generalization of social interactions under conditions of socio-cultural 
difference. Social contact, communication, and interaction with unknown or foreign 
persons are constantly increasing. At the same time, there is no automatic decrease 
in socio-cultural difference, since we are permanently having to deal with fresh 
cohorts of newly arrived strangers of all kinds. 
Despite these ever-new inputs, it is likely that the puzzling and disconcerting 
quality of the socio-cultural difference experienced on encountering strangers will 
wane. When socio-cultural difference is generalized and becomes a ubiquitous 
quality of interactional cohabitation in globalized world society, one may expect a 
growth in general ‘ambiguity tolerance’25—though there will no doubt continue to 
be aversive reactions to, and hostile acts against, people of obviously different 
socio-cultural backgrounds. Sociologist Rudolph Stichweh assumes that when 
cultural difference is considered universal in everyday life, we will act under the 
presupposition of socio-cultural similarity only in interactions within our very close 
social network (family, friends), while in professional life, in organizations of any 
kind, and at public events, we will generally assume we are interacting with socio-
cultural strangers with whom we do not share even the most basic assumptions 
(Stichweh 2004: 111–23). According to Stichweh, two conflicting assertions are 
possible: first, that in a globalized society alter is commonly a stranger; and second, 
that in fact nobody is a real stranger any more. The puzzling and estranging 
function of socio-cultural difference is replaced by indifference, consisting either in 
consciously eliding the alterity of the other or in adopting a stance of what 
Stichweh calls ‘minimal sympathy’—in other words minimal trust—towards them. 
But Stichweh does not provide answers to the question of what this means in 
concrete terms. What form would minimally sympathetic interaction with culturally 
different persons take? How can intersubjectivity be achieved across cultural 
difference? Before attempting to answer these questions, I will address current 
trends in the area of artificial intelligence and Alzheimer’s disease. This will put us 
in a position to judge all three alterities equally in regard to their relevance for 
foreseeable interactional practices. 
																																																								
 22 From 535 million airport arrivals to 1.1 billion today (http://www.econstats.com, accessed 2 
July 2013). 
 23 From 800,000 to over 3 million today (Chien 2010). 
 24 From 30,000 to 170,000 (OECD 2010: 126–7). 
 25 See the chapters by Else Frenkel-Brunswik in Adorno et al. 1950. 
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Artificial Intelligence: The Generalization of Socio-technical Difference 
Predictions about the growth in interaction with artificially intelligent technical 
devices are much more difficult to make than forecasts about globalization, 
because the dynamics and direction of technical innovation are harder to 
anticipate. Devices endowed with artificial intelligence today include robots and 
virtual agents—that is, machines and applications that are able to carry out 
specific, usually well-defined, tasks autonomously. Both may be designed with 
varying degrees of similitude to humans and varying degrees of interactional 
competence. 
By the end of 2011, the world had a population of around 17 million (professional 
and domestic) service-robots and 1.2 million industrial robots. Estimates predict 
the sale of a further 5 million public robots (for information, advertising, and the 
like) and a further 11 million domestic robots (lawn mowers, vacuum cleaners, 
window-cleaning machines, and such like) by 2015 and another 11 million robots in 
entertainment and education by 2013. Global sales of around 5,000 robots are 
predicted in inpatient and domiciliary care over the next two years. Examples in this 
category include the ‘FRIEND’ and ‘Care-o-bot’ robot-assistants and the robot 
‘cuddling’ seal named Emma.26 
According to statistics from the International Federation of Robotics, the market 
for domestic service-robots will grow much more strongly than that for industrial 
and professional service-robots. These domestic service-robots will take many 
forms. One group will include highly task-specific machines such as small cleaning 
robots that will inhabit the homes of the future and clean them while the human 
residents are out. They will be interactive only in a very basic sense, being able, for 
example, to sense and avoid other moving entities. A second group will include 
telepresence systems that will allow humans to log in externally via the web and 
move around their own houses or other locations and interact with geographically 
distant persons. These robots will also need to be partly autonomous, so that they 
can cover distances and return to their bases independently. A third group will 
comprise universal service-robots that are able to carry out a variety of mechanical 
tasks flexibly and autonomously in a human-like way. They will need to display 
considerable interactional skills, recognizing faces and voices, understanding verbal 
orders, answering questions, and proactively delivering spoken reports, advice, and 
reminders. In addition, they will have the capacity to learn and to draw on specific 
memories relating to people, tasks, and places. These robots will also be 
increasingly used in industry. In the longer term, they will be connected to personal 
virtual agents created on computers (Brooks 2002; Dautenhahn 1997; Dryer 1999; 
Cassell and Tartaro 2007). The governments of Japan and South Korea are already 
preparing for a ‘human–robot coexistence society’, which they believe will emerge 
by 2030 (Weng, Chen and Sun 2009). 
Scientific research has shown that people naturally tend to treat robots as they 
would humans and animals, and to ascribe corresponding attributes—such as 
names, genders, and personalities—to them. But the more the robots resemble 
human beings, the more readily they accept them and so developers try to build in 
functions that simulate human competences in more authentic, sophisticated ways. 
																																																								
 26 All figures from http://www.worldrobotics.org, accessed 19 July 2013. 
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On the other hand, this creates expectations in the human users which the robots 
are not always capable of meeting, and this then leads to a major loss of credibility. 
Although human qualities are sought-after, they are not all treated in the same 
manner. Proactivity in a human is viewed in a positive light; the same quality in a 
robot appears intrusive. This accords with the ‘uncanny valley’ hypothesis,27 which 
posits that the human acceptance of robots does not increase linearly with their 
growing resemblance to humans but instead falls off sharply when they approach a 
human most closely in appearance. Mobile robots in particular tend to be viewed as 
uncanny, ghoulish, abnormal, reminiscent of zombies, corpses, and other ‘creepy’ 
things. Developers are therefore well advised to leave a recognizable gap in 
appearance between robot and human (Hashimoto et al. 2002). 
In contrast to robots, virtual agents have no physical body and are not able to 
carry out physical tasks. They are entirely computer-generated and their purpose is 
to channel information and enable communication. Although no reliable numbers 
are available, a rapid growth in their application and usage is observable in the 
media, e-commerce, education, entertainment, and information. To quote a few 
examples: airport information is increasingly being provided by virtual agents, who 
are available 24 hours a day, 365 days a year—at JKF airport in New York City, for 
instance, hologram ‘Ava’ provides information to travellers about every aspect of 
the airport, their connecting flights, and so on; Microsoft’s ‘Clippy’ provides advice 
to users of Word and other applications; and Apple’s ‘Siri’ assists with web 
searches, scheduling, and diary management.28 
The social presence generated by virtual agents—and much more so by robots—
is already leading to certain behaviours in human users. These include a tendency 
to honour commitments involving them, to be polite in their presence, to be shy of 
undressing in front of them, and in some cases even to entertain affectionate 
feelings towards them. Virtual agents are reported to make web pages more 
interesting, entertaining, stimulating, and commercially successful for human users. 
For example: information delivered dialogically by agents with a human-looking 
appearance and a human-sounding voice is rated as more valuable than that given 
in text-form alone. On the other hand, where there is direct physical contact, many 
people prefer less human-like robots. Older people prefer robots without faces (S. 
Meyer 2011) and children rate human-looking robots as having more negative 
behavioural intentions than robots with other appearances (Oestreicher 2007; 
																																																								
 27 Mori 1970. Transl. in Macdorman and Minato 2005. 
 28 Other applications include: navigation, e-learning, telephone help-lines, and online marketing. 
The numbers of assistants of this kind is growing rapidly as speech-recognition software, 
dialogue capabilities, and simulation of human gesture and facial expression are enhanced. 
Designs vary: some are made to look like humans, others like cartoon figures or animals. 
Virtual Assistant Vendor Landscape 2011 estimates that ‘by year-end 2013, at least 15 per cent 
of [the 1000 largest American companies in terms of revenue] will use a virtual assistant to 
serve up Web self-service content to enhance their [customer relations] offerings and service 
delivery’. This is expected to rise to 100% by the end of 2015 (http://www.gartner.com, 
http://chatbots.org, accessed 19 July 2013). Enhancement of virtual agents is under way in 
areas such as connection to social networks, to mobile phones, and to search 
engines/information centres; and also conversational capacity beyond task-specific dialogue, 
simulation and recognition of emotion, and 3D representation, in order to enhance their 
social presence. In the longer term, computer–brain interfaces will facilitate direct 
communication with these devices and with an augmented reality, of which Google Glass is an 
early and much-publicized example. See Pickering 2010, Pérez-Marín and Pascual-Nieto 2011. 
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Cesta et al. 2007; Woods, Dautenhahn and Schulz 2004). Interestingly, older people 
also prefer care robots to human carers. 
It is clear from this that the robotization and automatization of our lifeworld, and 
the increasing contact with artificially intelligent devices that comes with these, 
will lead to the creation of new routines for interacting with robots and virtual 
agents—and thus also to a new culture of social interaction. Later on, I will try to 
identify some of these routines. Before that, however, I will outline a third general 
process of societal change: the relative growth in the numbers of people with 
dementia in society, and the resultant increase in contact and interaction with 
socio-cognitive strangers. This will complete the picture of future trends in societal 
hybridization and make it possible to go on and assess the relative impact of each 
of them. 
Dementia: The Generalization of Socio-cognitive Difference 
Demographic research labels the twenty-first century the ‘century of ageing’. In 
Germany—as in most other countries—the average age of the population is on the 
rise and in 2050 it is likely that, for the first time in human history, there will be 
more people over 50 than under 15 in the world (Kocka 2008: 217). For current 
world society as a whole, estimates posit a population of 18 million dementia 
sufferers. This number is set to rise to 40 million by about 2025—70 per cent of 
whom will be living in developing countries (Innes 2009: 27).29 In Germany today, 
300,000 new cases of dementia are diagnosed every year. This means that, with 
demographic change, the number of patients is constantly rising. Since prevalence 
increases with age, rising life-expectancy adds around 40,000 cases a year. In 2030, 
30 per cent of the German population will be older than 65. Around 20 per cent of 
them will at some point become affected by dementia (Deutscher Ethikrat 2012; 
Bundesministerium des Innern 2011). 
Today, there are around 1.4 million dementia sufferers living in Germany; in 2060 
there will be around 4 million, in a population that will have shrunk to only 70 to 72 
million. This trend means that in only 20 years, a minimum of every other person 
will be confronted with a case of dementia in their immediate family—that is, if 
they are not also dealing with sufferers in a professional capacity (Deutscher 
Ethikrat 2012: 34–5; Deutsche Alzheimergesellschaft 2012). Similar trends are 
identifiable for other European countries, the USA, Australia, and Japan. 
So far, there is no medical cure for dementia.30 As a result, the disease will 
become an integral part of these societies in the medium term. Because of its 
																																																								
 29 On Africa in particular, see Utvardy and Cattell 1992, and for Micronesia Keck 2010. 
 30 Dementia is an umbrella-term for symptoms that can be triggered by a number of causes. 
Alzheimer’s disease is the most common cause (67%), followed by vascular and circulatory 
problems (16%). There are also several secondary forms of dementia that have organic, 
infectious, toxic, metabolic, or traumatic causes. Numbering among these are dementias 
caused by alcoholism and Parkinson’s disease. Life expectancy after diagnosis varies widely; in 
the case of Alzheimer-related dementia it is around 8 years, and in the case of vascular 
dementia 4 years. Only secondary dementia is treatable—and indeed potentially reversible. 
Anti-dementive medication can so far only be used for the improvement of individual 
symptoms. See Deutscher Ethikrat 2012: 15–16. 
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specific symptoms, the disease challenges our social life, and the forms of social 
interaction we are used to, at the very roots. Nevertheless, given their sheer 
numbers, some form of straightforward, normalized contact with demented 
persons will inevitably emerge. Although societies are in general addressing the 
task of developing routines for interacting with groups—like strangers and 
robots—who are ascribed what one might call extraordinary social status, most 
have not yet worked out ways of interacting with the demented. The options for 
prevention remain unclear, continuous cognitive and motor stimulation currently 
being the most promising. The interactional feedback which patients receive from 
their social and clinical environment also plays an important therapeutic role. 
The different types of dementia have similar symptomatologies: loss of 
mnemonic and cognitive abilities; restricted spatial and temporal orientation; 
constraints on everyday activities; and behavioural changes such as social 
withdrawal, mistrust, apathy or disinhibition, and agitation. Typically, memory loss 
affects the present first and early childhood last (Piolino et al. 2003; Maxim and 
Bryan 2006; Kitwood 1997). 
Most of the international literature assumes three successive phases in the 
progression of the disease.31 The early phase is characterized by a decrease in 
short-term memory, difficulty in learning new things, a tendency to get lost, a 
reduced temporal and spatial sense, and a decline in autonomy in everyday life. In 
this phase, the disease is often denied or masked by the use of formulaic 
responses, but anxiety and social withdrawal are common. In the middle phase, 
patients become even more forgetful in terms of short-term memory and become 
disoriented even in familiar surroundings. Circadian disturbance and inability to 
cope become a more frequent occurrence. The third phase is marked by severe 
cognitive and mental loss manifesting itself in non-temporary misconceptions 
about people and situations and in various physical disorders. 
Obviously, the symptomatology of these three phases has consequences in terms 
of contact and interaction with dementia sufferers. Verbal expression and 
comprehension together with sufficient short-term memory to cover the 
immediate interactional history are necessary conditions for social interaction. 
However, it would be precipitate to regard the fact that coherent conversation had 
become impossible with a dementia sufferer as sufficient evidence for concluding 
that they were incapable of social interaction in general. And yet this is what is 
done in medical diagnostics when sufferers have their cognitive—and, implicitly, 
their interactional—abilities assessed.32 
																																																								
 31 See e.g. Förstl, Kurz and Hartmann 2011. Reisberg et al. 1982 distinguish seven stages. 
 32 Folstein, Folstein and McHugh 1975. Sociologically, these kinds of tests (which are used to 
distinguish the three phases of the disease previously mentioned) are open to criticism, 
because they disregard the special nature of interactional and social competence in dementia 
and tacitly incorporate the tester’s sense of what is normal as a basis for scientific judgement. 
For example: the time testers allow for an answer to be given is usually too short for the 
testees, but the testers make a tacit judgement about the length of these pauses (based on 
their everyday experience) and then take this as an indicator of cognitive competence 
(Ramanathan 1997; Sabaut 1991, 1999; Mace and Rabins 1981: 29; Hamilton 1994: 22). The 
tests thus manifest what amounts to a deficit bias, in that they are designed specifically to 
reveal cognitive weakness as measured against an implicit standard of what constitutes a 
‘normal wide-awake adult’ (Schütz and Luckmann 1973: 262). This is like repeatedly testing 
children for adultness and every time highlighting the inevitable deficiencies. Implicit 
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To sum up: societal changes induced by ageing, and the resultant increase in 
contact with cognitively impaired persons, will inevitably lead to the creation of 
new routines for interaction with dementia sufferers and to a new culture of social 
interaction. Again, I will later try to identify some of these routines. 
Emerging Cultures of Social Interaction 
Earlier on, I showed that there are societal changes on the horizon which will 
render our societies more hybrid and lead to a normalization of encounters with 
counterparts that were previously rarely met with or atypical. In regard to these 
developments, one is tempted to ask a number of sociologically oriented 
questions, including: How will basic social assumptions and interactional practices 
change with the generalization and normalization of these kinds of hybrid 
relations? What concepts might we use to describe interactions with, between, and 
among these entities—and are our current concepts adequate to this task? Before I 
embark on an analysis, however, a number of clarificatory remarks about the 
concept of interaction and interactivity as used here would seem to be indicated. 
In the theoretical literature, the definitions of interaction and interactivity vary 
widely according to the discipline using these terms. Researchers in Information 
Technology and Artificial Intelligence, for example, use a very broad concept of 
interaction, in which every form of mutual reaction is classed as interaction—
bringing it very much closer in meaning to reactivity. By contrast, sociologists have 
advanced a more exacting definition that does justice to the fact that humans are 
reflexive beings who construct their own conceptions of alter and incorporate 
expectations, projections, and anticipations of alter’s activities and viewpoints into 
their own motivation and action-planning. The particularity of the conditio humana 
consists precisely in the fact that, as well as being able to anticipate the actions (or 
expectations) of alter, we assume that they, equally, anticipate our actions (or 
expectations), and this ultimately generates ‘expectations of expectations’ and 
‘double contingency’—in other words, a mutual dependence of ego’s and alter’s 
next action on their respective anticipation of the action of their counterpart 
(Luhmann 1995: 103–36; Parsons, Bales and Shils 1953: 35–6). 
However, to expect double contingency in social interactions with strangers and 
liminal counterparts makes little sense. If we consider the case of interaction with 
infants, for example, we can readily see that the concept is too exacting. It 
therefore appears sensible to further differentiate the concept of interaction into 
components, or dimensions, which can be considered empirically one by one. This 
will provide a picture of the extent to which we are able to interact—in the sense 
of there being a production of mutuality—with each of the three alterities. 
Drawing on existing sociological theories, I will distinguish four dimensions of 
interactivity. 
																																																																																																																																																							
‘everyday’ interactional criteria are not the only factors to influence the view of dementia; 
social science and humanities theories—such as normative assumptions about consciousness 
and its communicative disclosure—also have an impact. Many sociological theories and 
methodologies—from those of Weber through those of Parsons and Schütz to those of 
Luhmann and the proponents of Conversation Analysis—presuppose an ideal, fully 
competent, actor (Cerulo 2009). 
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1. The most exacting dimension is topical continuation. This refers to 
sequentially and incrementally organized communicative acts by which 
alter and ego demonstrate that they are semantically and topically 
related and mutually referential. A particularly strong emphasis is 
placed on this dimension in Niklas Luhmann’s theory of interaction 
(Luhmann 1995). According to Luhmann, what (and who) is treated as 
part of the interaction, or not, is decided through sequentially 
meaningful communication and is manifested in the course of the 
exchange between the persons present (p. 411). 
2. The second dimension—shared knowledge—consists in the 
presupposition that the lifeworld as I experience it is shared by my co-
interactant and that our perspectives are reciprocal. In order to 
interact successfully—in other words for the interaction to run 
smoothly and for us to avoid having constantly to explicate tacit 
assumptions—we have to presuppose that our counterpart brings 
with them similar background assumptions as we do about the 
interactional situation and its relevance and meaning. In addition, we 
have to be able to activate specific knowledge about our co-
participants and situate the interaction in the here and now. These 
aspects are highlighted both in phenomenological sociology and in 
ethnomethodology, as developed respectively by Alfred Schütz and 
Harold Garfinkel (Schütz 1962; Schütz and Luckmann 1973; Garfinkel 
1967). It is a characteristic feature of interaction (termed ‘face-to-face 
situation’ and ‘We-relationship’ by Schütz) that ego and alter are in 
‘temporal and spatial immediacy’ to one another and thus experience 
each other simultaneously (Schütz 1967: 178.). Included in this is the 
offering, by each to the other, of a ‘maximum of symptoms’ that both 
are able to observe (ibid.). Because ‘alter’s body is present to me as a 
field of expression for my subjective experiences’, I achieve access to 
alter’s motivations for action and interpretations of the situation (p. 
163). 
3. The third dimension is the ability of the co-participants to procedurally 
and formally configure an interactional situation. This includes the 
turn-taking system, the utterance of feedback signals and continuers, 
and the production of (appropriate) second actions after specific first 
actions (answers to questions, for example, or greetings in response to 
greetings). This dimension has been emphasized particularly strongly 
in Conversation Analysis. According to this approach, intersubjectivity 
is procedurally achieved through the sequential and internally ordered 
progression of interactional acts (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974; 
Schegloff 2007: 1–3). From this perspective, the organization of 
intersubjectivity results from the formal, sequential character of turn-
taking (Schegloff 2007: 252, 264). The specific practical devices used to 
secure understanding in an interaction are: recipient design, through 
which an utterance is, from the outset, formulated in such a way as to 
be understandable by its designated individual addressee; and repair, 
which is brought into play when a misunderstanding or error has 
occurred and which temporally suspends the ongoing interaction. 
Sequentiality, in combination with topical continuity, thus provides the 
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means for procedurally organizing social interaction, securing 
understanding, and constantly checking and confirming 
communicative success, or making any necessary revisions to achieve it 
(Bergmann 1988: 39–46). Without sequentiality—this is the basic 
assumption of Conversation Analysis—interaction is impossible 
(Heritage 2008). 
4. The fourth and final dimension consists in the ability to establish 
interactional co-presence—in other words a basal bodily responsivity 
on the part of the interactants. Mutual awareness and monitoring, 
addressing, and bodily coordination are important constituents of 
successful social interaction. This particular quality of interaction has 
been highlighted by both Erving Goffman and—even more strongly—
by George H. Mead. In Mead’s view, individuals do not enter into 
contact with one another; rather the individual is shaped, from the 
start, by participation in social situations. This comes about because 
they have absorbed the meaning of social acts through the repeated 
experience of social situations; and they have thus internalized 
meaning as an expectation of behaviour. Participants in social 
situations achieve identical emotional states through bodily, gestural, 
or auditory utterances. Those who produce an utterance bodily 
anticipate the responses of their interlocutors and thus adopt (‘take’) 
their role (Mead 1910). In this way, ‘practical intersubjectivity’ (Joas 
1985) is produced. The ongoing mutual adjustment occurs ‘because 
the individuals to whose conduct our own answers are themselves 
constantly varying their conduct as our responses become evident. 
Thus our adjustments to their changing reactions take place by a 
process of analysis of our own responses to their stimulations. …. We 
are conscious of our attitudes because they are responsible for the 
changes in the conduct of other individuals’ (Mead 1910: 403). A great 
portion of social interaction happens in a bodily responsive manner 
beneath the threshold of consciousness—a process Mead terms 
‘innervation’ (Mead 1974: 24, 104). Goffman also views interaction as 
something that occurs when participants in a social situation are in 
bodily co-presence. In such conditions, they are ‘admirably placed to 
share a joint focus of attention, perceive that they do so, and perceive 
this perceiving’ (Goffman 1983: 3). This gives them a feeling of joint 
activity, which they privilege above everything else in their 
surroundings (Goffman 1959: 13–14; 1963: 13–22, 89). 
The presence and operationality of these four dimensions are basic to the social 
interactions that we conduct in everyday life. However, in contact with socio-
cultural, socio-technical, or socio-cognitive strangers—and other types of alter—
any one of them may become precarious or problematic. Thus, in the course of the 
successful or unsuccessful operation of these dimensions, the feasibility and 
likelihood of interaction with the new alterities in question is revealed, and their 
partaking in the social world becomes empirically observable. Through the analysis 
of natural occurrences of interaction as represented in the literature, each of the 
three forms of alterity becomes delineable and specifiable in its individual 
particularity. 
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Taking this as my starting-point, I will now analyse each of the four dimensions in 
relation to each of the three selected alterities, drawing on empirical studies that 
explore interactional processes with those alterities. I will begin with the socio-
cultural alterity triggered by globalization. Examination of this will put us in a 
position to contrast this older and more familiar experience of alterity with the 
newer and more unfamiliar forms. 
Socio-Cultural Alterity 
Topical Continuation 
In the case of encounter between socio-cultural strangers, the first and most 
exacting interactional dimension—topical continuity—primarily requires of the co-
interactants that they use a shared set of semiotic resources for communication. 
Only if the two co-interactants share, at least rudimentarily, a language or gestural 
repertoire (as in sign languages) will they be able to relate topically to one another 
in a meaningful way. And indeed, when people from a number of different parts of 
the world meet up, as they do in virtual online worlds, their initial (and, in terms of 
topical continuity, elementary) interactional activities relate to the identification of 
a shared language (Schroeder 2011, esp. 188–9). 
However, even where there is a shared language, topical continuity can be 
difficult, as is shown by the following, typical, example of an interaction occurring 
under conditions of cultural difference. The interactants are a Somali mother (M) 
and a British paediatrician (P). 
 
Example 133  
2  P so what sort of questions have you got in your mind for me 
     today  
3    (.) what do you want me to do 
4    (1.0) 
5  M mm no: she say 
6  P today 
7  M eh: the lady [receptionist] she say if you want to contacting 
 doctor eh: you want eh: talk him 
8  P yeah 
9  M I say yes I am happy with e- with you 
10 P right right ok 
11 M because (.) definitely when I am coming with you 
12   when I go back I will go back happy 
13 P ((laughs)) I hope so 
14 M because I will look to see you and your doctor K (.)  
15   I like it 
16 P good 
17 M cos when when I come in will come in the you know ((tut))  
18   when I go back my home I’m happy 
19 P right 
20 M ((laughs)) 
21 M so you want me to- (.) check her over 
																																																								
 33 Roberts 2007: 250–1. 
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In this example, topical continuity is precarious because the two interactants 
appear to have different concepts of how a medical interaction should be 
conducted and how the subject of medical examination should be approached. 
Whereas the British paediatrician expects a concrete reason for the woman’s visit 
(her baby’s specific symptoms, for example), the Somali mother interprets his 
questions in a different sense: she explains to the (male) paediatrician why she has 
chosen him rather than any other paediatrician. 
There may be underlying, cultural reasons for her interpretation. As cross-cultural 
studies of medical interaction have demonstrated, communicative expectations in 
regard to doctors are culturally variable. Whereas in most Western cultures 
patients are expected to name their symptoms and discuss them with the 
physician, in many non-Western cultures patients expect their doctors to make a 
diagnosis based on physical examination, to give clear advice, and to institute 
measures for recovery (Angelelli 2004). In our example, the divergence in 
expectations in regard to topical continuity does not actually lead to 
communicative breakdown; instead, the interaction continues because the doctor 
ignores the divergent interpretations and eventually answers his own question (l. 
21). This indicates that, in interactions under the condition of alterity, it is only 
when disturbances are crucially damaging to the ongoing exchange that they have 
to be solved. This is usually done by further interactional measures such as repair, 
in which the ongoing interaction is temporally suspended to allow for the solution 
of possible problems. Once the repair is successfully completed, interaction is 
resumed.34 Where direct intercultural interactions become regular and continuous, 
these idiosyncratic in situ solutions give rise to ‘contact languages’ and ‘contact 
cultures’. These eventually form the basis of pidgin and creole languages and 
cultures (Brandstetter et al. 2004; Piller 2002, esp. 244). 
Problems of topical continuation also occur in very routinized interactional 
episodes such as so-called ‘adjacency pairs’ (compliments and responses to them, 
for example, or greetings) and in the introduction and preparation of critique. 
These are highly enculturated practices in which meaning is not coded in lexico-
semantics, with the result that misplaced attributions can occur. Examples of 
attributions include the interpretation of German communicative behaviour as cold 
by Australian co-workers (Grieve 2010) and the interpretation of the conduct of 
Spanish students as narcissistic and whiny by British fellow students (Lorenzo-Dus 
2001; le Pair 1996). In addition, deep-rooted differences in regard to basic 
understandings of the world and the agentive person can influence, disturb, or 
interrupt topical continuation and create misunderstandings (for example 
regarding the possibility of spiritual journeys; Sharifian 2010, esp. 3370). 
To sum up: interactions, though fragile and culturally bound, have the ability to 
procedurally fix problems of understanding and produce intersubjectivity as they 
go along—almost in a self-organized manner. However, this will only happen as 
long as more basic requirements of interaction—such as joint linguistic or other 
(e.g. gestural) communicative skills—are present. 
 
																																																								
 34 Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977. For a particularly good example, see Firth 1996: 244. 
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Shared Knowledge 
In what has preceded, I pointed out that the meanings sedimented in language 
and interactional practice often vary culturally. This is also true of other areas of 
cultural expressiveness: symbols, objects, and practices have different meanings in 
different cultural contexts—to the extent that some scientists have claimed that 
an individual’s modes of thought are dependent on their culture and language-
systems (the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis; see Lucy 1992, 1997; Gumperz and Levinson 
1996). Anthropologists have documented fundamental cultural differences not 
only in basic ontological, cosmological, epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic 
assumptions about all kinds of phenomena, but also in perception and cognition. 
What emerges from these studies is that cultural differences can affect the core 
perceptions and conceptualizations which humans have of the world.35 These in 
turn obviously have a bearing on how liminal social beings—cultural strangers, the 
demented elderly, and robots, but also children, animals, and spirits—are viewed in 
terms of their status as interactional counterparts and whether they are included 
in, or excluded from, the social world.36 
Particularly well-researched examples in this area include colour perception and 
spatial orientation.37 Some languages, for example, have no concepts for relative 
spatial orientation such as ‘in front’, ‘behind’, ‘left’, ‘right’ (egocentric spatial 
orientation). Instead, they use only absolute concepts such as ‘north’, ‘south’, ‘east’, 
‘west’ (Levinson 1996, 2003) or ‘uphill’, ‘downhill’, ‘seaward’, ‘landward’ (Brown 
2008) (geocentric orientation). Here are two examples of geocentric statements: 
 
Example 238 
1 Look out for that big ant just north of your foot. 
2 (There is) a crumb on your seaward cheek. 
 
One can imagine that this kind of statement sometimes leads to interactional 
troubles. In addition, conceptualizations of time (which are often derived from 
spatial concepts) may also differ fundamentally. This is because there are few, if 
any, language universals (Evans and Levinson 2009). Homo sapiens appears to be 
the only species with a communication system that is fundamentally variable (in 
other words, cultural) at all levels. 
But shared knowledge is relevant not only for basic ontological conceptions but 
also for interactional practices—where politeness is concerned, for example, or 
appropriateness of language, or of gesture, in specific social situations (generic 
knowledge). Empirical studies show that gestures do not simply vary interculturally 
in their meaning; they may acquire opposing meanings (Meyer 2013). Again, 
opinions differ as to whether, when, where, and how certain types of talk should be 
used (Hymes 1962). Only when there is a shared stock of semantic knowledge are 
																																																								
 35 See e.g. Reichel-Dolmatoff 1971; Viveiros de Castro 2009; Keifenheim 1999; Carrithers, Collins 
and Lukes 1985. 
 36 Of the many sources, see e.g. Kaplan 2004; Barker 1990; Nadasdy 2007; Knight 2005; Kirksey 
and Helmreich 2010; Rabinow 1992; Meyer 2010; Proschan 1997; Stewart, Barnard and Omura 
2002; Gottlieb 2008; Prout 2004; Wagner 1981; Jackson 1998; Povinelli 1995. 
 37 On colour terms, see Berlin and Kay 1969, Lucy 1997, Saunders 2000, Levinson 2000. 
 38 Deutscher 2010: 122. 
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basic interactional activities possible. One process in which this is highlighted is 
assistance with word-searching (Piller 2002, esp. 236). Further illustrations are to 
be found in minor everyday rituals such as collective toast-raising and drinking. The 
kinds of toasts used in Georgia, for example, are reported by Kotthoff to be 
extremely difficult for strangers to adjust to because they praise ‘good 
Georgianness’ and ‘true virility’ as central values (2007, esp. 185–92). The toasts are 
highly emotional and, in addition, have religious connotations. Another example of 
the importance of shared knowledge in such contexts is provided by the following 
reconstruction of a conversation between an American student (Mary) and a 
visiting Finnish student (Kirsti). 
 
Example 339 
1 Mary:   Hi Kirsti!!! How are you?  
2 Kirsti: Thank you, good.  
3 Mary:   Are you enjoying your stay?  
4 Kirsti: Yes, very much. 
5 Mary:   It’s a beautiful day outside isn’t it? 
6 Kirsti: Yes.  
7 They talk for a while longer, then say ‘Good-bye’. 
 
Mary reported afterwards that Kirsti seemed uninvolved and uninterested and 
that as a result she (Mary) had avoided further meetings. This in turn gave Kirsti the 
impression—in line with a clichéd view Fins commonly have of Americans— that 
Mary was superficial. 
Sometimes, however, interactions with socio-cultural strangers can appear 
strangely familiar in that they evoke well-established connotations—but of a 
negative kind. One study, for example, showed that Japanese people often 
perceive the interactional style of strangers as similar to that of high-status 
towards low-status Japanese. As a result, they have the constant tacit impression 
that their own social status is being violated and that they are being degraded. This 
in turn causes them to avoid these kinds of encounters (Kowner 2002). This may be 
one of the motivations for Japanese government decisions to restrict immigration 
and to work towards replacing human labour with robots and virtual agents. 
In addition to differences such as these in regard to communicative conventions 
(that is, socio-culturally typical forms of interaction), there may be differences 
relating to the interactional relevance of knowledge about personal histories. In 
some cases, culturally conventionalized expectations regarding demonstration of 
personal familiarity with the co-interactant can differ to the extent that personal 
hurt or offence is caused to the counterpart (Bailey 2000, esp. 97). 
In many cases, however, interactions occurring under the condition of socio-
cultural difference are shaped right from the start by the co-participants’ 
knowledge that their own expectations may remain unfulfilled (Markaki and 
Mondada 2012; Asmuß 2003; Nishizaka 1999). This undoubtedly contributes to this 
kind of interaction being conducted with a greater ‘tolerance for ambiguities’. 
However, even this more tolerant stance cannot preclude the occasional 
expression of morally charged judgements in the form of tacit sympathy or 
antipathy. 
																																																								
 39 Carbaugh 2005: 39. 
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As we have seen, in intercultural interactions considerable gaps can occur in 
relation to what individuals are accustomed to assume is common ground. But the 
emergence of the sort of reduced but universal common ground that would be 
needed if intercultural interactions were to become standard is currently 
observable in the moves towards forms of political correctness that de-thematize 
difference. An example is the way in which people in many work-places now wish 
each other ‘Season’s Greetings’ instead of ‘Merry Christmas’ at the year-end 
holiday. 
To sum up: in a society in which interaction is based on the fundamental 
assumption of alterity, topical continuity can generally be maintained because 
sequential procedures are flexible enough to self-correct and self-sustain. 
However, stocks of knowledge can collide or be mutually exclusive (as in the case 
of spatial orientation, where no independent third form is possible). That said, in 
the course of repeated interaction, stocks of knowledge become more and more 
inclusive, flexible, and—eventually—cosmopolitical (in other words sensitive to, 
and competent in regard to, socio-cultural alterity). 
Formal-Procedural Operationality 
The formal-procedural dimension encompasses the ways in which co-interactants 
signal to one another that they are listening to, and monitoring, one another. How 
does this work under conditions of cultural difference? What interactional 
procedures do co-interactants use to indicate that they consider the activity in 
which they are engaged to be of a particular kind—a conversation, say, rather than 
a lecture, a flirtatious exchange, a dispute, a work-related exchange, and so on? 
One important requirement for interaction is that not all participants speak 
simultaneously. How, then, is turn-taking organized in such a way that all have a 
chance to speak but do not do so simultaneously, thus ensuring understanding is 
procedurally possible? How are conversations organized in way that obviates 
lengthy, unpleasant pauses and the risk of the conversation’s falling apart as a joint 
activity? 
Whereas the topical, semantic, and knowledge-based differences that exist 
between distinct cultural settings are easy to identify, the formal-procedural 
dimension often operates tacitly and unthinkingly, with the result that differences 
are not easily recognized as being cultural. Such differences in the formal 
organization of intersubjectivity do, however, also exist—and this is not surprising. 
For one thing, the attention and listening that occurs in the course of an interaction 
can be displayed by different semiotic means. In Western societies, the means 
commonly used for these purposes is gaze. In other societies, however, looking 
one’s interlocutor repeatedly or continuously in the eye during a conversation is 
perceived as confrontational or highly intimate (C. Meyer 2011). In these cases, 
gaze and head gestures are sometimes eschewed and replaced by auditory signals, 
some of which take the form of long confirmatory repetitions of what has been 
said. The following exchange recorded among the Tzeltal Maya is an example of a 
conversation in a community in which gaze is avoided in interaction and is replaced 
by vocal repetition. 
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Example 440 
01 A I'd just come back from fetching those greens just this 
     morning. 
02 B These greens here.  
03 A I'd come back from fetching them.  
04 B Ah. 
05 A So that's how it was. We got rained on on the way here.  
06 B Eh! So you got it on the way here.  
07 A We did.  
08 B You did. It was this morning.  
09 A It was.  
10 B It was.  
11 A It was.  
12 B So it was you just returned then. 
13 A Just returned then.  
14 B Returned.  
15 A Returned.   
 
Tzeltal interactions involve a number of ways of monitoring visual information in 
social (and other) environments, but these do not depend on eye contact: vocal 
repetition does the work of establishing mutuality. In this sense, the example 
above echoes certain situations in Western culture, such as radio-conversations, in 
which exclusion of the visual realm is imposed by the technical conditions. 
However, it is not just the type of signal that can vary culturally; so too can the 
number. A study of interactions in Japan has shown that feedback-signals are used 
much more frequently than in England (Cutrone 2005). Differences like these in the 
use of recipient signals also contribute to the shaping of positive and negative 
perceptions of alter in intercultural situations—and ultimately also to the 
formation of stereotypes. 
It has also been found that assessment of adequate pause-length between turns 
varies heavily cross-culturally. In many Western societies, the maximum length of a 
pause in a conversation before it is perceived as an awkward silence is one second 
(Jefferson 1983). In other communities, there are different standard lengths and 
different judgements about when and where you should be silent or speak.41 
Divergence in the assessment of what constitutes an appropriate pause is well 
described for Aboriginal communities, the phenomenon being highly relevant in 
Australian intercultural trials, where the assessment of what is an appropriate 
pause-length differs between (Anglo-Australian) lawyers and judges and 
(Aboriginal) witnesses and defendants.42 Since pause length is taken by judges and 
lawyers (and jurors) as a strong indicator of the credibility of a response, and 
because manipulation of such pauses by a questioner is an important tool in 
generating social pressure, the different perceptions as to appropriate pause-
length impact upon both judgement and sentencing. 
																																																								
 40 Brown 2000: 203–4. 
 41 An example as famous at it is controversial is the ‘silent Finn’. See e.g. Tryggvason 2006. 
 42 Eades 2007. As the author says (p. 288): ‘Of course, we customarily define interruption as 
involving a second person starting to talk before the first speaker has finished talking. But if 
we accept that the first part of an Aboriginal answer often starts with silence, then to start 
the next question before the Aboriginal interviewee has had the time to speak, is in effect to 
interrupt the first part of the answer.’ 
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In the literature, the interactional practices of Aboriginal people are related to an 
entire cultural system inspired by a default position of ‘non-dyadic’ and 
‘continuous’ interaction. Because Aboriginal co-interactants—in contrast to their 
Western counterparts—assume that the conversational floor is open at every 
moment (‘continuous’), they can entertain long pauses without commenting on 
emergent silences and without having repeatedly to reopen the interaction 
whenever they want to talk again. At the same time, it is unusual, in an Aboriginal 
setting, to interact dyadically (communication is ‘non-dyadic’); rather, the standard 
model is to address utterances to the whole group (‘talk is broadcast’). If someone 
feels addressed, they may reply. There is no clearly demarcated participation 
framework (no speaker, addressee, audience, etc.). One effect of this is a 
technological preference on the part of Aboriginal communities for conference-
style over dyadic telephones (Walsh 1991). 
When it comes to politics in societies with non-dyadic interactional styles, one 
result of the abandonment of the dyadic interactional structure in favour of an 
open conversational floor is that decisions are made not in dialectical conversation 
but in a polyphonic manner. There are numerous accounts of such non-dyadic 
political debates in which the formal style precludes individually motivated 
contributions and in which anyone who tries to press others into a particular 
position immediately loses their social status. In these debates, individual 
contributions are made in such a way that others are able to contribute their view 
as part of the ongoing activity, so that ultimately a joint utterance arises to which 
everyone present has contributed and in which no individual authorship is 
identifiable. The result is a consensual statement that does not endanger the 
political order of the group.43 
As we have seen, the formal procedures that shape interactions, in an embodied 
and pre-reflexive manner, can differ considerably between cultures. At the same 
time, these differences are normatively charged, so that variations (long pauses, 
for example, or overlaps) often help create stereotypes, or have to be accounted 
for in interaction. Thus, somewhat counter-intuitively, the formal procedures 
involved in conducting an interaction do not provide a suitable basis for 
commonality—on the contrary, they may create an appearance of understanding 
whilst in fact creating confusion. 
Co-presence and Bodily Responsivity 
The fourth dimension of interaction I shall discuss here encompasses bodily 
responsivity and the corporeal means of creating co-presence. Reports by travellers 
describing first-contact situations with people from other cultures indicate that the 
human body is a ready means of intercultural communication. Typical human needs 
such as hunger and thirst can be signified by gestures, and these are 
comprehensible to counterparts. But more abstract content can also be 
communicated fairly easily, as an extract from the diary of Martin Frobisher, an 
Arctic traveller of the late sixteenth century, shows. He describes interactions with 
the Inuit on an island in the northern part of Hudson Bay. The locals communicated 
with him by—as he puts it—‘making signes with three fingers, and pointing to the 
																																																								
 43 Graham 1995, esp. 139–70, with a good example on p. 155. 
Meyer: New Alterities and Emerging Cultures of Social Interaction 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 3 26 
	
Sunne, that they mean to returne within 3 days, untill which time we heard no more 
of them, & about the time appointed they returned’.44 Frobisher also mentions how 
potential communication-problems were solved: ‘And if they have not seene the 
thing whereof you aske them, they will wincke, or cover their eyes with their hands, 
as who would say, it hath been hid from their sight. If they understand you not 
whereof you aske them, they will stop their eares.’45 
This account demonstrates that our bodies act as a universal anatomical reservoir 
for cross-cultural communication. However, in the view of Marcel Mauss, the body 
is by no means universal; it is in fact a ‘main locus of culture’ and humanity’s primary 
technical object and instrument. Bodies are therefore never merely natural; they 
are cultivated and culturally charged. For example, says Mauss, ‘[t]he positions of 
the arms and hands while walking form a social idiosyncrasy, they are not simply a 
product of some purely individual, almost completely physical arrangements and 
mechanisms’ (Mauss 1935/1973: 72). This is why the coordination, disciplining, and 
ritual shaping of human bodies constitute important elements of sociality—and 
thus allow the possibility of a wide range of cultural differences which, instead of 
facilitating cross-cultural communication, actually obstruct it. 
Differences are not restricted to bodily practices; the meaning and use of the 
senses can also differ—as we saw in the ‘gaze’ example above. Every difference in 
bodily convention affects the course of interactions conducted under conditions of 
alterity. In many countries, for example, the body and its expressivity are subject to 
various taboos—such as that concerning left-handedness in many Islamic and West 
African societies or the objection to the consumption of food or the performance 
of acts of personal hygiene in public in many other societies (Ameka and Breedveld 
2004). Even the interpretation of bodily postures and positions, and the attribution 
of specific emotions to these, varies from culture to culture (Kleinsmith, De Silva 
and Bianchi-Berthouze 2006). Distance between interactants is a case in point: 
Italian men, for example, stand closer to one another than do German men, who in 
turn stand closer to each other than do American men. In male–female pairs, 
Germans and Italians adopt the same distance whereas US couples stand further 
apart (Shuter 1977). Doctors, for whom proximity is a professional necessity, 
nonetheless display less affective behaviour towards patients from other 
cultures.46 These bodily cultures are shaped in childhood. In interactions in the 
playground, for example, children of the Anglo-American middle class keep further 
apart from one another than do working-class African-American or Puerto Rican 
children (Aiello and Cooper 1972; Baxter 1970). Children of African-American 
families also touch each other significantly more during interactions than do their 
Anglo-American counterparts (Willis and Hofmann 1975). Where they attend 
predominantly Anglo-American or mixed schools, both Anglo-American and 
African-American children reduce the amount of touching they engage in as they 
move from kindergarten to 6th grade. Among African-American pupils in schools 
attended mainly by children of their own group, this does not occur. Bodily contact 
between the two overall groups, meanwhile, almost never occurs (Lafrance and 
Mayo 1978). 
																																																								
 44 Quoted at Hewes 1974: 10. 
 45 Quoted at Hewes 1974: 11. 
 46 Schouten and Meeuwesen 2006, Steffensen and Colker 1982. This is also true in judicial 
processes—see Fontaine and Severance 1990. 
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Culturally shaped preferences in regard to personal bodily practices are, of 
course, related to socialization. A study comparing hygiene practices in families in 
Los Angeles and Rome showed that in Los Angeles, much more attention was paid 
to the early development of the children’s personal autonomy in certain well-
defined individual areas, whereas in Rome the central concern was the proper 
implementation of effective practices and the assumption of responsibility by the 
whole family. In Rome, homes are much smaller, with the result that privacy is much 
less and expectations in regard to it are necessarily much lower (Fasulo, Loyd and 
Padiglione 2007). In contrast to these socio-culturally idiosyncratic situations, there 
are currently also new cultures emerging which involve the virtual cultivation of 
global bodies. One example is hip-hop breakdance, representing a potpourri of 
globally diffused and locally contextualized practices through which the actors in 
question negotiate complex identities (Osumare 2002). Globally circulated media 
are thus contributing to the creation of models for bodily practices that go beyond 
locally shaped particularities—and in the future may also provide a template for 
globally operational bodily cultures. 
All the enculturated bodily practices mentioned here result from ‘tacit 
knowledge’, which can vary widely from culture to culture and is difficult to 
elucidate. By way of conclusion, then, we might say, one the one hand, that the 
body can serve as a common ground for communication and as a universal 
repertoire for communicative forms (metaphors, for example) (Freyre 1986; Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980). On the other hand, lurking beneath this assumed universality 
are cultural specificities that threaten to undermine apparently successful 
communication. 
To summarize: we have seen that, given human reflexivity, interaction with socio-
cultural strangers is flexible and circumstantially adaptive, and this flexibility has 
undoubtedly been one of the driving forces of history. Whereas persistent 
semantic divergences render the interactional dimensions of shared knowledge, 
and necessarily also topical continuation, extremely precarious, the temporal-
sequential and bodily structures that humans share existentially appear to provide 
a common ground for interaction under conditions of socio-cultural difference. 
That this is so is demonstrated in migrant societies which have had to deal with 
socio-cultural hybridity from their very beginnings. In Brazil, for example, where 
interaction with socio-cultural strangers has always been standard, the bodily and 
sequential dimensions of human existence have grown to form, as it were, a 
common reservoir of shared assumptions.  Although they do not yet serve self-
evidently as the sole common ground, these nonetheless shape everyday 
interaction (see esp. Freyre 1986). 
Socio-Technical Alterity 
As we have seen, joint sequential and bodily structures can serve as initial (and 
sometimes illusory) common ground for interaction under the condition of socio-
cultural difference. This finding can be taken as a starting-point for the analysis of 
contact with robots and virtual agents. 
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Topical Continuation 
Topical continuation has always ranked as one of the most spectacular abilities 
that robots and virtual agents are endowed with. Even very early experiments in 
creating artificial interactions between humans and computers produced 
remarkable results. ELIZA, a virtual psychotherapist developed by computer-
scientist Joseph Weizenbaum and much lauded by psychiatrists of the time as 
representing the therapeutic future, managed to convince a number of users that 
their interlocutor was a human being working from another computer.47 
Weizenbaum’s shrewd tactic of getting ELIZA to repeat users’ remarks back to 
them in the form of questions was particularly effective in giving the dialogues the 
feel of a therapeutic session.48 The programmed ability to identify specific words 
and word-types, and to produce either appropriate empathic statements or 
references to the semantic category to which the words or word-types belonged 
(motherfamily, for example), was also an elegantly simply way to generate 
discursive coherence. ELIZA thus built on the human inclination to project meaning 
onto just about anything.49 
However, the ultimate goal of AI engineers is to create an adaptive agent that 
can act flexibly and appropriately in a variety of social situations. Since the ability to 
generate topical continuation depends on an accurate assessment of the social 
situation in which one finds oneself, building in the capacity to select appropriate 
speech-genres presents a notorious problem for developers of robots and virtual 
agents. This becomes evident in the following examples of interaction between, in 
each case, a user (N) and a virtual agent (A), where sequential progression is 
problematic and topical relatedness precarious. 
 
Example 550 
01 N Are you hungry? 
02 A I’m not allowed to say. 
03 N Do you like pizza? 
04 A I’m sorry, but I’m not allowed to leave. 
05 N Spaghetti? 
06 A That’s a good question. 
A virtual agent may manage repeatedly to create the illusion of possessing 
sophisticated interactional skills, but this impression is inevitably dashed shortly 
afterwards. 
 
Example 651 
01 A What’s your name? 
																																																								
 47 Of relevance here is the Turing test, success in which (still awaited) requires that a human 
computer-user be unable to tell whether an online interlocutor is a human or an AI entity 
(Turing 1950; see also Epstein, Beber and Roberts 2009). 
 48 The idea of creating social resonance through the repetition of utterances is currently being 
tested in the realm of gesture—see Kopp 2010. 
 49 Weizenbaum 1976. On the human inclination to attribute sense and intention, see Dennett 
1987. 
 50 Krummheuer 2010: 121–2. My translation. 
 51 Krummheuer 2010: 168. My translation. 
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02 N Are you really interested in my name? 
03 A Is the Pope Catholic? 
04 N ((laughs)) And if I’d prefer to remain anonymous?  
05 A You don’t even wanna know. ((grins)) 
 
Sometimes even the re-use of a name that has already been mentioned—the 
most basic step in establishing an elementary interactional history—poses great 
problems for the virtual agent (Klüwer 2011: 4). 
However, topical continuation can sometimes be established when the human 
interactant is aware of the capabilities of the technical device and adapts very 
closely to them. Because people are used to dealing with counterparts of one kind 
or another who are not fully interactionally competent (in the sense of the 
theoretical dimensions of interaction mentioned earlier), they will often apply this 
knowledge in interactions with robots and virtual agents as well (Kulyukin 2004, 
esp. 254). On the other hand, verbal abuse of robots and agents is also a common 
phenomenon, apparently serving the purpose of distancing oneself from the 
technical device but also of testing its human-like properties (Levy 2009; Bartneck 
and Hu 2008; De Angeli and Carpenter 2005). 
The level of topic continuation in interactions with robots and virtual agents is far 
from rudimentary. Clearly task-oriented conversations often run smoothly, as do 
conversations which—like those used with ELIZA—are designed from the outset to 
be non-specific and in which the purpose of the virtual agent is merely to stimulate 
self-reflection by its human interlocutor. In most cases, however, use of the robot 
or virtual agent is limited to what its capabilities allow, notably if the user is aware 
of how the device or programme functions. Everyday conversations that are not 
pre-structured are one area in particular in which a robot or virtual agent will often 
produce inappropriate, ‘oblique’ turns, leading to the breakdown of the interaction. 
Thorough knowledge, on the part of the human user, about the technical device’s 
capacities is therefore indispensable in securing topical continuation with robots 
and virtual agents. 
Shared knowledge 
One-sided knowledge is, however, not sufficient for successful interaction. To 
ensure comprehensive capability in regard to topical continuation, robots, given 
that they are in communication with the real world, must be provided with 
‘knowledge’ (information). In contrast to the situation with virtual agents, this 
knowledge cannot be fully programmed in and has, rather, to be inscribed through 
learning processes (Ghidary et al. 2002, esp. 181). Virtual agents, meanwhile, have 
already been programmed with categorical and semantic knowledge. Basic agents 
designed for administrative and memory-related management, for example, are 
able to flexibly order and manage spoken information.52 
An example drawn from a dialogue between a user (U) and a virtual ‘Senior 
Companion’ (SC) about a group-photo from a holiday in Tanzania shows what more 
is possible. The system had recorded from a previous conversation that the user 
has a daughter named Zoe. 
																																																								
 52 Dahl et al. 2011, and see p. 293 for an example. 
Meyer: New Alterities and Emerging Cultures of Social Interaction 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 3 30 
	
Example 753 
7  SC: How do you know Octavia? 
8  U:  She is my daughter. 
9  SC: Aha! We see. Octavia’s sister is Zoe. 
10 SC: How old was your daughter Octavia when this photo was 
taken? 
11 U: Octavia was 19 years old. 
12 SC: What was the occasion of this photo? 
13 U: This was another family holiday. 
14 SC: Where was this photo taken? 
15 U: This photo was taken in Tanzania. 
16 SC: Have you ever been to Zanzibar? 
17 U: Yes, I have. 
18 SC: Great place, we hope you saw the beaches. When was this 
 photo taken?  
19 U: Last year. 
 
As we can see, the system is able to draw simple conclusions by referring, on the 
one hand, to pre-programmed semantic knowledge (for example, that daughters of 
the same parents are called sisters) and to episodic knowledge from past 
interactions, and is thus able to interpret new information. In addition, it is able to 
retrieve new information from the Internet—in this case that Zanzibar is famous 
for its beautiful beaches. 
Robots programmed in this way also need to learn to combine the resultant stock 
of information with visual perceptions (Lemaignan et al. 2012, esp. 193). In 
addition, in order to interact successfully with humans, they must have a kind of 
interactional memory that will mediate between the concrete here-and-now and 
the unfolding, ongoing interactional process. This is a basic prerequisite for 
achieving task-orientedness. Though impressive, memory of interaction-history in 
robots and virtual agents is still mostly far too inflexible. This often frustrates 
human users. Interaction with artificial telephone-agents is a case in point: 
deficiencies in the system cause it to keep repeating information or demand it in a 
‘bossy’ tone. As a result, the system often comes across as arrogant, stubborn, or 
actually aggressive (Wallis 2008, esp. 449–50). 
In general, the ability of robots and virtual agents to share stocks of knowledge 
of a semantic, episodic, or declarative type with human beings is impressive. Often, 
however, the way in which this knowledge is used is still too inflexible for 
interaction. This was why, in the 1990s, engineers began to realize that, if we want 
them to be able to situate and embody knowledge as humans do, robots and 
agents ultimately have to be designed in a way that enables them to learn by the 
same bodily means and experiences (Brooks 1990, 1991; Brooks and Stein 1994). 
Only through learning will devices be able to apply knowledge to specific situations 
and thus develop the ability to act flexibly according to circumstance. 
 
																																																								
 53 Catizone and Wilks 2011: 304. 
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However, this kind of pre-programmed behaviour sometimes fails—for example, 
when the human co-interactant expects an action different from the one the 
programme is able to provide (Lohse et al. 2009, esp. 318). Between humans, this 
would not pose a problem, since both partners in the interaction are constantly 
mutually adjusting their expectations as part of the ongoing activity. A robotic 
system, by contrast, is not flexible enough to allow for different, but still normal, 
conceptions of what it is to show or be shown round a home and be able to 
respond appropriately. This would require being able continually to recognize the 
other person’s behaviour, interpret it correctly, and respond flexibly to it with an 
appropriate follow-up action. 
Ultimately, since the human organization of interaction on which the 
development of robots is based is not universal (as shown in the earlier account of 
socio-cultural alterity), most of the devices that are currently being built are usable 
only by a small number of (mostly Western) communities in the world. For the 
development of cross-culturally operational technologies, a de-Westernization of 
the interactional principles built into robots and virtual agents would be required.55  
Nevertheless, it may be said that in general, although robots and virtual agents 
are still one-dimensional in their behaviour, the procedural organization of 
interaction is the component that has been simulated most successfully—in 
relation to users in Western and Japanese societies. 
Co-Presence and Bodily Responsivity 
At first glance, the greatest problem technical devices face in trying to appear as 
human as possible is their lack of a body. Robots already have physicality and 
developers of virtual agents are trying to simulate bodily presence for this group 
also. What motivates these endeavours is the fact that humans view agents more 
readily as conversational partners, and adopt a cooperative social stance towards 
them, when they are animated and possess bodily social presence (Louwerse et al. 
2009). Human interactants readily greet and cooperate with robots and agents 
when these are either physically present or live on video (Bainbridge et al. 2011). 
But increased social presence evokes an even more positive social response to 
agents. Perceptions about the degree of intelligence of a robot or agent correlate 
significantly with animacy, and the more animated their face, the more likely it is to 
attract the attention of the user (Bartneck et al. 2009; Novielli, de Rosis and 
Mazzotta 2010). This is why the display of emotion is a major topic in robotics 
research (Amores, Mancho ́n and Pe ́rez 2011: 322). 
A significant problem of interactional co-presence in relation to robots and virtual 
agents is mutual monitoring. Robots continue to have difficulty in distinguishing 
humans from other objects in their surroundings and in detecting their heads and 
recognizing their faces and voices. Humans, meanwhile, will often readily interact 
with robots in a bodily way, once a framework for participation has been 
established (Lee et al. 2006). While some users are reluctant to have closer tactile 
contact, people who are more positively disposed to robots in general view those 
that interact by tactile as well as by vocal means as less machine-like (Carpenter et 
																																																								
 55 For a discussion on this, see Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010. 
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interact appropriately with numerous counterparts of greater or lesser 
interactional ability. At the same time, devices will have to prepare for a degree of 
abuse, given that humans do not as yet project emotion or sensitivity onto them. 
The situation is a different one in our next example—interaction with dementia 
sufferers—where projection, by both sides, of greater competences than those 
that actually exist can lead to misleadingly workable interchanges. 
Socio-Cognitive Alterity  
As we saw earlier, the joint sequential character of social interaction in particular 
provides a common ground for interaction with socio-cultural and socio-technical 
strangers. In the case of socio-cultural alterity, topical continuation can be flexibly 
assured, but in socio-technical alterity, it has not yet been successfully simulated. 
Shared knowledge, meanwhile, is precarious in both cases. Bodily responsivity, 
though it works reasonably well in both alterities, clearly demands a certain level of 
familiarity and trust, which, in these alterities, have first to be established by other 
means. By contrast, when it comes to dementia sufferers—the group we shall now 
move on to consider—interaction often does occur under conditions of trust and 
familiarity, since it takes place with family members or long-term carers from 
outside. We will now take a closer look at the way in which each of the four 
interactional dimensions functions in relation to this group. 
Topical Continuation 
We have seen that in interactions with socio-cultural and socio-technical 
strangers, topical continuation is fragile and problematic. This is no different when 
it comes to interaction with dementia sufferers, although in general it is safe to say 
that the more familiar the social relations are to the co-interactants, and the more 
familiar the physical environment, the fewer the interactional troubles.59 The 
communicative utterances of people with early-phase dementia are generally 
described as fluid and syntactically well formed but in many cases meaningless. 
Because of mnemonic, expressive, and conceptual problems, dementia sufferers 
often produce inappropriate (oblique) sequential actions that are regarded as 
meaningless by healthy co-interactants. Interactions are therefore relatively short-
lived and often end in breakdown (Appell, Kertesz and Fisman 1982: 83). The 
following example, in which linguist Heidi talks with dementia sufferer Elsie, 
illustrates this phenomenon. 
 
Example 1060 
1 Elsie: And where did you say your home was? 
2 Heidi: I'm on Walter Road.  
3 Elsie: You can do that. That's a good idea. 
 
																																																								
 59 See esp. Ramanathan 1997. 
 60 Hamilton 1994: 2. 
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As this indicates, even in the early phase of dementia, utterances become 
increasingly vague. Sufferers provide less and less of the kind of information that is 
crucial to comprehension and more and more peripheral information and vague 
references (Hamilton 1994: 25–6; Ellis 1996: 483–90, McLean 2006: 167). Other 
problematic areas are the production of discursive coherence and the distinction 
between fact and fiction (Killick 1999; McLean 2006: 167–9; Ellis 1996: 474). 
Communication thus progressively loses its propositional function and condenses 
into what anthropologist Malinowski once called ‘phatic communion’, meaning ‘a 
type of speech in which ties of union are created by the mere exchange of words’ 
(Malinowski 1923: 315). The socializing aspect of communicative activity is 
maintained (or even increased) and the informational quality reduced. 
In the middle phase of the disease, the utterances of sufferers become lengthy 
and clumsy; in the late phase they shrink to no more than a few words, and 
eventually the person becomes largely silent in terms of verbal activity. 
Many of these symptoms derive from a core communication problem of 
dementia, namely that it leads to difficulty in word finding. This results in the 
replacement of a precise word with an imprecise or semantically related one, or in 
circumlocutions and semantic and phonetic transformations. ‘Match’, for example, 
may be replaced with expressions such as ‘thing’, ‘lighter’, ‘the thing we light 
candles with’, ‘fire bug’, or with a meaningless but phonologically related sound 
such as (let’s say) ‘tcham’ (Appell, Kertesz and Fisman 1982; Hamilton 1994: 14). 
In everyday interaction, such word-finding difficulties are often of no significance, 
because both interactants actively cooperate in the constitution of meaning by 
fleshing out vague content. By contrast, in interactions with dementia sufferers, 
the burden of the search for meaning has to be shouldered to a large extent by the 
healthy co-interactant. As a result, topical continuation becomes precarious from as 
early as the first stage of dementia. Conversations in which facts play an important 
role, discussions about clear-cut, explicit stances, and interchanges about 
experiences and events become increasingly difficult. In this process, the co-
interactants unaffected by dementia have to adjust more and more to the 
diminishing capacities of their counterparts. 
Shared Knowledge 
The lexical deficiencies that characterize dementia—and which contribute 
significantly to problems with topical continuation—originate in the loss of 
mnemonic content that afflicts the sufferer. This loss also affects other areas of 
knowledge which, with ‘normal wide-awake adults’, can be assumed to be shared. 
However, during the first phase, dementia sufferers are still able to empathize and 
assume the role of the other: they try to account for word-finding problems, for 
example, or for problems with other declarative and episodic knowledge.61 In other 
words, they are aware of their loss of knowledge and of the fact that this may be 
puzzling for their interlocutors. In the middle phase, this ability fades away and 
there is no longer any awareness—at least in communication—that their own 
behaviour may be confusing for their counterpart (Kitzinger and Jones 2007; 
																																																								
 61 On different forms of memory, see Tulving and Craik 2000. 
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Hamilton 1994: 41, 55). The following example illustrates an interchange during the 
first phase of the disease. 
 
Example 1162 
1 Heidi: Do you know Jill? 
2 Elsie: Jill.  
3 Heidi: Jill Masters? The person who runs all of the activities?  
4 Elsie: Well, I don't know. I've had so many names (that I it) 
sometimes they are hard to get uh pickly I mean quickly. 
[laughs] 
 
One study describes how a dementia sufferer telephones her daughter every day, 
but each time forgets important details of her daughter’s life—that she has broken 
her leg, for example, of that she has a son (the sufferer’s grandson). Instead, partly 
also in order to mask her deficiencies, she talks about her own needs and problems 
and this produces an impression of egocentrism (Kitzinger and Jones 2007). Such 
examples show that the ability to respond to specific situational affordances, and 
the loss of specific memory relating to particular co-interactants, fade relatively 
early in the middle stage of the disease (Bayles 1985; Hamilton 1994: 52; Bryden 
2005: 42–3). 
Autobiographical memory, including memories of one’s own family, is also 
gradually lost.63 However, there is more to this than the simple disappearance of 
content. Because of the way the brain works, all of us, including dementia 
sufferers, are continually reconstructing our biographies on the basis of the 
information available to us. But dementia sufferers have a diminishing stock of 
memories and in their case the task of maintaining a consistent self is therefore a 
minute-by-minute endeavour64 and the permanent changes in biographical 
structure that result often bring with them a growing alienation from family, 
friends, and carers (Randall 1996: 237–8). In the case of immigrants, loss of 
autobiographical memory leads to the loss of second-language skills, so that, at a 
certain point, they become unable any longer to speak or understand the language 
of their adopted country (Hyltenstam and Stroud 1993). 
As these examples show, during the early and middle phases of the disease, 
various kinds of knowledge—particularly declarative and episodic knowledge, but 
also role-taking and awareness of the cognitive and normative expectations of 
alter—become more and more troublesome for dementia sufferers. In the case of 
socio-cultural strangers, this knowledge can be accumulated through everyday 
experience and learning (and possibly also through explanation); and in the case of 
socio-technical strangers, it will mostly be additionally programmed in. In the case 
of socio-cognitive strangers, by contrast, the loss of memory entails a loss in the 
ability to learn in general, so that interaction with dementia sufferers does not 
exhibit the quality of potential mutual adjustment. Instead, the cognitively 
unimpaired counterpart has to adapt to the capabilities of alter. If they can expect 
any change, it will be further loss rather than any remedy. 
																																																								
 62 Hamilton 1994: 57. 
 63 See Healing Project 2007: 35–6 for an example. 
 64 Piolino et al. 2003, and for an example McLean 2006. 
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Formal-Procedural Operationality  
Despite all these problems, in situations where the interactional machinery is 
highly routinized, interaction with dementia sufferers does often work. This is 
especially true for familiar social exchanges (‘Hello’–‘Hello’, ‘How are you?’–‘Fine’, 
and so on). In the middle and late stages of the disease, vague, sometimes 
nonsensical, answers are given merely to sustain sociality through the turn-taking 
structure. This is linked to another typical trait of the middle phase, namely the 
unusually frequent use of repetition. This practice has been termed ‘involuntary 
parroting’ by psychologists and is described by them as being devoid of meaning 
and caused by lack of cognitive control (Guendouzi and Müller 2006: 168–88; 
Shindler, Caplan and Hier 1984). However, sociological studies based on audio 
recordings indicate that it serves as a means of making repairs and securing 
communication (Hamilton 1994: 54, 73–7; Mikesell 2010; Kitwood and Bredin 1992). 
In order to keep an interaction running procedurally, tag questions or other 
devices are needed to signal to the counterpart that an utterance has not been 
understood. The capacity to deploy these devices remains functional in the middle 
phase of dementia (Hamilton 1994: 61–2). However, it is also at this stage that 
problems emerge in regard to situating the interaction in the here and now: 
indirect statements are no longer understood; expressions such as ‘I wonder where 
the book is’ are interpreted by the sufferer not as a question or request but as 
information about the speaker (p. 86). 
In the late stage of the disease, questions are no longer answered in a 
differentiated way. Despite their lack of language abilities, dementia sufferers are 
still capable of agenda-setting. In the following example, dementia sufferer Elsie 
induces topic change through her gaze-behaviour. 
 
Example 1265 
1 Heidi: Do you need another Kleenex?  
2 Elsie: (directs gaze away from Heidi toward picture)  
3 Heidi: Are you looking at the picture? This one? Isn't that 
pretty? Those colors.  
 It says it's by Sally. Do you know Sally? Sally. Do you 
know that person? ...  
         Isn't that pretty? (leaves to get Kleenex) 
 
Heidi, the healthy interactant, volunteers herself as spokesperson to articulate 
Elsie’s utterances. Because Elsie, in the late stage of the disease, can only signal 
acknowledgement, Heidi asks yes/no questions until intersubjectivity is 
procedurally achieved. 
The ability to fulfil the requirements of the formal, procedural dimension of 
interaction thus remains intact longer than content-related skills. This parallels the 
findings for the other two alterities considered here, namely that the 
procedural/sequential dimension of social interaction is the most unproblematic 
one, providing a timing basis for social interchange. 
																																																								
 65 Hamilton 1994: 127. 
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Co-Presence and Bodily Responsivity 
As we have just seen, even when dementia sufferers have lost the ability to 
communicate semantic content, their competence in terms of the rhythmic timing 
of interaction remains functional. Late-phase sufferers still allow pauses between 
their utterances, enabling co-interactants to take over the floor; and even in 
interactions that are completely devoid of semantic meaning, dementia sufferers 
attend to the turn-taking system, as an example from an American nursing home 
shows. 
 
Example 1366 
1  Abe: Bupalupah (singing)  
2  Ann: (turns to Abe)  
3  Abe: Brrrrrrr! (melodical)  
4  Ann: Brrrrrrr! (imitating) 
5  Abe: Bah!  
6  Ann: Shah! 
7  Abe: Bah! 
8  Ann: Shah! 
9  Ann: (turns away from Abe)  
10 Abe: Bupalupah!  
11 Ann: (raises one arm above her head and lowers it in a swift 
motion with a sharp flick of her wrist)  
 
This exchange is devoid of semantic content, but the prosodic features of the 
contributions are extremely well matched. In the late phase, affective interaction 
of this kind usually replaces topical interaction. For example, where verbal 
resources are reduced, affection may be expressed by the fondly articulated 
utterance of the simple word ‘You’, or by touch (Healing Project 2007: 14, 19, 76–7; 
Bryden 2005: 138). The importance of affective interaction in such situations is 
probably also the reason why the co-presence of animals—on a visit to a farm, for 
example—proves therapeutically beneficial and helps assuage the dementia 
sufferer’s symptoms (Jens 2008: 153–4; Bryden 2005: 146–7). 
That the body plays a vital role, not only in maintaining interactional skills but 
also for the well-being of the demented person as a whole, is recognized in a wide 
range of ethnographic reports (Kontos 2006: 198–201; Healing Project 2007: 45; 
Bär 2010). Even when semantic and episodic knowledge have already disappeared, 
embodied procedural knowledge remains functional. In the late stage of the 
disease, dementia sufferers can still sing and pray together, exchange touches and 
caresses, and carry out practical activities together. It is often their body that 
continues to know about the forms and purposes of objects, about possible 
activities with persons and things, and about the enjoyableness or unpleasantness 
of particular interactions. This knowledge resides in the body, and only when the 
body is directly stimulated to reveal it can it actually be activated, since cognition 
has already lost any relation to it (Healing Project 2007: 45). 
																																																								
 66 Kontos 2006: 206–7. 
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Clearly then, whereas the first two phases of the disease see the loss of semantic 
and pragmatic communication abilities, the knowledge ‘sedimented’ in the body, as 
‘practical sense’ (Bourdieu 1980), remains functional until the late stage. Existing 
templates for motion and interaction with other bodies, and also for dealing with 
artefacts, enable continued meaningful access to the environment. 
Echoing Merleau-Ponty, psychiatrist Thomas Fuchs describes this practical sense 
as ‘body memory’ and talks about it as being anchored in the body (Fuchs 2010; 
Leibing 2006). Body memory is not representative like declarative memory; rather, 
it embodies and re-enacts experience through bodily practice. Embodied 
experience is an integral part of the person, since it re-creates the real, living 
presence of the past. In advancing this notion, Fuchs is challenging scholars such as 
Eric Kandel, Hans Markowitsch, Jan Assmann, and Harald Welzer, who, in the 
tradition of John Locke, view memory (in particular autobiographical memory) as 
the distinguishing characteristic of human beings, without which they lose their 
status as social persons (and along with it certain moral and legal rights) (Kandel 
2006; Markowitsch and Welzer 2005; Assmann 1977; Locke 1690/1975). Some 
contemporary moral philosophers from the Anglo-Saxon and German world go so 
far as to rank the personal status of dementia sufferers below that of healthy non-
human higher-order mammals (Singer 1980: 178–86; McMahan 2002: 43–8; Quante 
2002). 
Clearly, then, an embodied form of interaction is still possible in the final phase of 
dementia. Affective-bodily forms of interaction are particularly successful, and in 
general the more routinized an interactional practice has become throughout life, 
the more easily retrievable it will be even under conditions of dementia. 
This brief account indicates that, as the disease moves through its various stages, 
interactional abilities shrink down to the basic procedural and bodily dimensions. 
One is tempted to see this as a kind of ontogenetic reversal, in which the sufferer’s 
capacities are eliminated one by one in just the same way as they were built up in 
childhood, excepting that embodied knowledge and practical skills accumulated in 
adult life remain present even into the later stages of the disease. 
Summary 
Despite their differences, the types of alterity considered here can still be 
compared and evaluated in respect of their individual characters. Although socio-
cultural alterity throws up significant (albeit relatively easily resolvable) problems 
in the semantic and shared-knowledge spheres, the temporal and bodily aspects of 
the human condition provide a starting-point for social interaction. Socio-technical 
alterity, meanwhile, can evoke an impression of alienness in terms of the bodily 
dimension (though it is well-received when restricted to predefined areas of 
corporeal activity). At the same time, it works reasonably well in terms of the 
procedural dimension and is flexible enough in the semantic and shared-knowledge 
spheres to accommodate adjustments in human users’ behaviour. Socio-cognitive 
alterity, like its socio-cultural counterpart, poses most problems in the semantic 
and shared-knowledge spheres, but procedural and corporeal interaction remain 
functional and provide a basis for continued meaningful interaction. 
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On the basis of this brief and necessarily limited empirical account of the 
interactional capacities of the three selected alterities, we are now in a position to 
identify potential trends in emergent areas of conflict and to outline the kinds of 
cultures of social interaction that may arise in the shorter and longer term. 
Conclusion: Societal Hybridization and the Future of Social Interaction 
In this paper, I have discussed three particular forms of societal hybridization, 
selected because they generate, in both distinct and parallel ways, alterities which 
individuals and societies will increasingly have to face in the future. I have focused 
on the challenges which all three of these alterities pose for routinized social 
interaction. Two of them—the stranger and the person of unsound mind—are 
already familiar to human society; the third, the artificially intelligent other, is 
completely new. But even this new form of alterity, alien as it may appear, is 
designed along human lines in terms of cognitive and social function. Engineers 
strive to create virtual agents and robots that simulate human competences and 
practices as closely as possible. The entities that result have a strange familiarity 
about them and trigger expectations that cannot always be fully met. 
Whether these alterities are new or old, the likely increase in the normalization of 
everyday contacts with them will inevitably generate routine modes of interaction 
with the three alters in question. This process will no doubt begin primarily in the 
industrialized societies but will, in the long run, spread across most of the globe. 
Instead of defining the cognitive and interactional capabilities of the relevant co-
interactants in terms of their deficits, these modes will need to ensure consonance 
with them (Nussbaum 2006, esp. 384–8). As I have indicated, these emergent 
modes of social interaction with different types of strangers also partly draw on 
existing, established patterns of interaction with liminal social beings such as 
children, animals, and individuals who are inebriated or deranged. 
In the longer term, the three emergent processes will lead to interaction 
between the three alterities themselves. Examples here include: robots taking care 
of dementia sufferers; cultural interactional dispositions being inscribed into the 
design of robots and virtual agents and these devices subsequently interacting 
with people unfamiliar with these dispositions; immigrants who become victims of 
Alzheimer’s losing their familiarity with the language and culture of their adopted 
country and, in turn, possibly being taken care of by culture-specific robots; and, 
finally, virtual agents being used to provide language and cultural training to 
groups such as military personnel preparing for interaction with cultural strangers 
(Sagae, Johnson and Valente 2011). In order to respond adequately to the 
challenges that arise here, we will need a more flexible and broader-ranging model 
of social persons and agents than was so far presumed necessary. 
How will the three processes of hybridization described here change the shape of 
interaction in everyday life? Very generally, we can say that a higher degree of 
tolerance for ambiguity will certainly be required on the part of the ‘normal, wide-
awake adult’ to enable them to interact with the different entities. Fundamental 
assumptions that are currently still regarded as common to large numbers of co-
interactants—assumptions not only about social interaction but also in regard to 
ontological matters—will have to be either de-specified, temporarily suspended, or 
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de-thematized. This in turn will lead to a de-dramatization of difference. In our 
interactions with robots and virtual agents of varyingly human character, we will 
have to develop competences that enable us to deal appropriately with each of 
these entities. 
At a formal level, interaction with each of the alterities considered here will have 
to be decelerated, so that, for example, longer pauses can be made without 
causing a breakdown in the interaction. Since the only interactional dimension that 
has proved to be more or less functional in all three alterities is formal-procedural 
operationality, it may be assumed that this syntactic, sequential, and rhythmic 
dimension will gain in interactional importance, whereas the symbolic and semantic 
dimensions will decrease in significance. A de-semanticization, de-symbolization, 
and de-narrativization of general culture is therefore likely,67 potentially reinforced 
by new media-practices (excluded from consideration here for reasons of space). In 
this process, meanings and symbols are likely to lose their collectively binding 
function. 
One important fact to emerge here is that the therapeutic and socially 
meaningful inclusion of dementia sufferers will only be possible when the fuller 
integration of affective bodily interaction into daily life has become socially 
accepted. Such an integration would include a stimulating and symmetrical care-
environment comprising affective-bodily and practical interactivity. The body may, 
in the long run, serve as a means of uniting the different alterities—with the 
possible exception of artificial personas.68 This possibility also suggests that joint 
collaborative activities (playing football, making music, work-related training) are 
better ways of creating interactional bases characterized by mutual interest, 
respect, and understanding than are deliberative discourses rationally conducted in 
domination-free circumstances (cf. Sennett 2012). If in future, when we find 
ourselves in situations of joint relevance, we interact with one another in practical 
but highly responsive ways, we will develop forms of social interaction that are free 
from semantic controversy and are sedimented in bodily and procedural routines 
(Buber 1962). As a result, social cohesion may, in the future, reside in practical, 
bodily, and procedural mechanisms rather than in systems of shared meanings and 
symbols. 
In regard to all three types of alterities, it therefore seems sensible to refrain 
from focusing exclusively on the agency and ‘mind’ of the other, and instead 
acknowledge the significance of their appearance. A culture that concentrates more 
on how we perceive alter and what they do to us as social and emotional beings 
would seem to be a good thing. Hence, very generally speaking, a cultural shift 
involving a turning-away from mind towards interaction, from intelligent thinking 
to social-emotional being, and, possibly, from reality to appearance, would seem 
beneficial—and feasible (Coeckelbergh 2009; Abney and Bekey 2012; Wallach 2010; 
Levy 2008). 
																																																								
 67 Lorenzer (1986: 46) views de-symbolization as the dissociation of linguistic and practical 
figures constitutive for the creation of symbolic representations. A further approach is that 
taken by grammaticalization theory, which also assumes a growing syntacticalization and de-
semanticization (Hopper and Traugott 1993). For a similar approach in relation to ritual, see 
Staal 1979. No sociological theory, however, has yet been formulated. 
 68 This idea was advanced by Freyre (1986) in relation to the radically heterogeneous society of 
Brazil. 
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Only by making such a shift will we escape the procession towards a future 
devoid of truly responsive counterparts who stimulate us in novel ways and 
sometimes refuse compliance, resist our control, or elude our social conventions. 
Only with such a shift will we be able to progress both individually and as a society. 
The dangers of a ‘post-social’ society’ populated by hedonistic individuals who 
make use of simulation-media to create only those counterparts they decide they 
want and only in their own image have already been documented (Knorr Cetina 
2001). Stichweh, as we have seen, argues that in a globalized society, strangers will 
lose their unsettling qualities and be increasingly met with indifference and 
minimal sympathy. He appears to overlook the fact that the potentially disturbing 
qualities of strangers may, equally, produce a quite different outcome, stimulating 
and inspiring us in ways that I believe we should make every effort not to lose. 
Overall, then, it is highly likely that, in the near future, circumstances will force us 
to develop social and cultural ways of being in which alterity and hybridity are both 
a way of life and a cultural resource that helps us to further development. Although 
difference and similarity (or, as it were, ‘family resemblance’) will continue to be 
themes in social and cultural life, new forms of sociality will emerge in the context 
of this dialectical relationship. Under the pressure of constant innovation—
particularly in the area of artificial intelligence, but also as triggered by a better 
understanding of existing alterities such as dementia sufferers and animals—social 
ontologies are now in a state of continual precariousness and fragility. As a result, 
we will be constantly confronted with new forms of affiliation, sociality, and 
sociability. These in turn will generate new competences in dealing with the 
permanently evolving alterities, whose morphological properties will in each case 
have to be considered anew. 
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Alzheimer Alterities and Technological 
Change 
	
 
Commentary by Stephen Brown 
	
	
Christian Meyer’s paper, ‘New Alterities and Emerging Cultures of Social 
Interaction’, considers three important macro-social trends – namely higher rates of 
immigration and dementia, as well as the increase in contact between humans and 
artificial intelligence – and, given these new alterities, suggests that a cultural shift 
has begun in social interaction patterns. Meyer’s text is both broad and deep, as it 
combines a long-term, a ‘big picture’ approach with in-depth research on the 
components that fuel the emerging cultures he discusses. The result is an eye-
opening portrait of changing cultures of communication. Much can be learnt from 
reading it, potentially multiple times to appreciate better the wealth of original 
analysis it provides. 
Alzheimerization and adaptation to new alterities 
My own reading of Meyer’s text, especially the parts concerning socio-cognitive 
alterity, was very much influenced by my personal experiences with my late 
mother, Marianne, who had Alzheimer’s disease. Over the course of several years, 
as Marianne’s dementia progressed, an extremely familiar person became 
increasingly like a stranger – a new alterity emerged, even if she still retained the 
essence that made her Marianne. Had she lived long enough to reach the final 
stages of the disease, the socio-cognitive transformation may have become almost 
complete: She could have become recognizable only physically and her children 
might have become complete strangers to her. 
Our patterns of social interaction certainly changed over time. Telephone 
conversations became more difficult, as I could not pick up on visual clues that 
could help me understand what was going on in Marianne’s mind when she could 
no longer clearly express herself verbally. The goal and means of communication 
also shifted. Spending time together became more important not only to ascertain 
her needs, but to also interact. She became more tactile, drawing greater comfort 
from physical contact with people and with soft objects within her reach. As ‘shared 
systems of meaning and symbols’ faded, conversations became less linear, rational, 
based on ‘intelligent thinking' or designed to exchange information. Instead, they 
took on a freer form, with me seeking above all to stimulate her and assure her 
‘social-emotional’ and physical well-being. I stopped trying to understand the 
details of her statements and developed what Meyer calls a greater ‘tolerance for 
ambiguity’. 
	
I wonder to what long-lasting impact this experience has had on me. To what 
extent could I do this with a stranger? I would surely be less inclined to spend the 
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required time to engage difficult communication with a true stranger than with a 
family member in the process of socio-cognitive alterization. Still, I believe that I 
have begun to adapt to a new culture of communication, not one that I desire or 
expect to use in my day-to-day exchanges, but one that I am better prepared to 
deploy if the need arises. And as the processes Meyer describes further develop, I 
am likely to draw in that new tolerance of ambiguity more often. 
My experiences of living in countries where I had a very poor command of the 
national language had already helped me empathize with socio-cultural alterity. My 
mother’s illness helped me learn to deal with socio-cognitive alterity. I still need a 
lot of work, however, in dealing with socio-technical alterity. I cannot empathize 
with a machine and, moreover, I object to having to waste my time in sometimes 
frustratingly inefficient human-machine interaction solely because private 
companies want to save money. Unlike the other two alterities, the socio-technical 
difference is often the product of corporate cost-saving decisions, not the result of 
social phenomena such as increased immigration and the aging of the population. 
When new alterities meet: robot/dementia patient interaction 
Meyer’s paper makes some mentions of interactions between artificial forms of 
intelligence and the elderly, including people with dementia – when socio-technical 
difference meets socio-cognitive difference. It therefore made me think about how 
a robot companion or caregiver could have helped Marianne and how she would 
have reacted to it. I think at the initial stages of her dementia, she would have 
objected quite vehemently. She would have called it ‘creepy’. She hated to be 
patronized by humans, so she no doubt would have been annoyed by the insincerity 
of any expression of concern coming from a machine. She would also have been 
frustrated by instances of the robot misunderstanding her meaning, which at that 
stage would be more frequent than in interactions with human beings.  
Still, I suspect she would have been quite happy and sometimes even amused to 
have a robot companion in later Alzheimer stages, as long as it looked friendly. 
Meyer’s pet analogy seems quite apt, but the robot’s duties would go beyond those 
of a pet. I don’t think she would have discriminated much between human and 
mechanical co-presence, as long as they were performing their duties similarly. If 
she did feel a rapport with the robot, I am sure physical interaction – the robot 
holding her hand, giving her a hug – would have been welcome, especially if the 
robot were covered in a soft, fuzzy material.  
I don’t believe, however, that everyone would have been as accepting of a robot 
companion as Marianne. She was exceptionally sweet and easy-going for a person 
with dementia. Less trusting and less pleasantly disposed people might interact 
with much difficulty – just as they do with human beings. Could a robot perform its 
duties effectively with such a person? Probably not if the person were aware of the 
artificiality of the intelligence and reacted in a hostile manner. 
Still, a robot might be better equipped than a human to deal with a verbally 
belligerent or physically violent person (less likely to be irritated or injured), with 
someone who reverted to a foreign tongue (it could be programmed to be 
multilingual) or long pauses in conversation. People who act as caregivers to 
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dementia patients are more likely than average to suffer depression and even 
develop dementia themselves. Robots, of course, are immune to such problems 
and robot-assisted care would be able to reduce the toll on human caregivers. With 
a little technological progress, remote sensing would also enable robots to monitor 
heart rates and breathing patterns more easily and less intrusively than human 
beings. 
I imagine artificial intelligence algorithms and computer interfaces will need to 
improve significantly before they are able to communicate effectively with people 
with intermediate-stage or advanced Alzheimer’s. It may technologically feasible 
for them to follow a person’s gaze, be programmed with the language(s) that the 
person is speaking, but the non-linearity of conversations and difficulties in 
communicating at would potentially be quite difficult to surmount. For instance, 
Marianne sometimes inserted seemingly random words into her statements, such 
as Palestinians, hemisphere, sandbox, greyhound and jitterbug. How would a robot 
have dealt with them? It would have to be programmed with filters that would pay 
less heed to such nonsensical talk, while remaining attentive to words that might 
suggest physical or psychological distress in a context in which simply asking if 
anything is wrong might not elicit an intelligible answer. In this regard, it is hard to 
imagine robots being as adept as human in picking up visual signs of distress, such 
as facial expressions, but such advances are possible. 
Towards alterity synergies? 
My own experiences, especially my Alzheimer-induced exposure to socio-
cognitive alterity, have given me a glimpse at the future that Meyer envisions. 
Communication may be more difficult, but there will be trade-offs, including a 
premium on empathy. In addition, there should be some useful synergies between 
socio-technical and socio-cognitive differences – and presumably with socio-
cultural differences as well. In other words, artificial intelligence may help us adapt 
to the other new alterities. 
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The normalization of socio-cultural 
difference and the future of democracy 
	
	
Commentary by Daniel Gaus 
	
	
Christian Meyer’s piece on ‘New Alterities and Emerging Cultures of Social 
Interaction’ offers rich and fascinating insights into some of the fundamental 
changes currently under way in (Western) societies. Meyer draws our attention to 
phenomena whose societal effects are clearly set to be as powerful as they are 
unpredictable. By highlighting the ways in which robotization and societal ageing 
are challenging core modes of social interaction, he is helping to flesh out what has 
so far been a somewhat poorly developed political debate. Discussion of these two 
trends still centres mainly on their economic implications—namely, the increased 
burden of long-term financial provision occasioned by demographic ageing, and the 
need for compensatory measures to deal with growing industrial robotization and 
concomitant job-losses. 
The observations which Meyer makes on the third ‘new alterity’—namely, 
increasing experience of socio-cultural difference—are no less illuminating but, by 
contrast, do form part of an established debate about the effects of this 
phenomenon on political life. Globalization, migration, feminism, and European 
integration have all, in various ways, helped to anchor the phenomenon of 
increased encounter with, and recognition of, ‘the other’ firmly within the research-
agenda of normative political and democratic theory. In democratic theory, the 
critique which this has elicited from ‘difference democrats’1 bears striking 
similarities to Meyer’s contention regarding a ‘blind spot’ in our understanding of 
social interaction. Meyer argues that ‘[c]onceptions deriving from the 
Enlightenment have been particularly influential in causing us to restrict our view 
too narrowly to cognitive-mnemonic, anthropic, and putatively rational but—as will 
be shown here—highly culture-bound aspects of the social person’ (p. 3). This is 
precisely the reason which difference democrats cite for their rejection of the still 
dominant liberal understanding of democracy. They object that liberal democratic 
theory—be it in the form of a rational-choice-inspired economic theory of 
democracy or, as has been the case more recently, a deliberative democratic 
approach—starts from a very narrow conception of the individual as a rational 
political person. Economic theories of democracy see political behaviour as driven 
by cost–benefit calculations based on individual preferences and possibilities. In 
the view of deliberative democratic theory, by contrast, the notion of politics as a 
series of cost–benefit play-offs is too narrow and takes no account of the role of 
normative political discourse. Despite its own objections, deliberative democratic 
theory is itself held to be overly rationalistic. By viewing democratic politics as a 
quest for consensus, so the charge goes, it is clinging to a utopian ideal. It assumes 
																																																								
1  ‘Difference democracy’ is not an established paradigm or school of thought. I use the term 
rather loosely to describe theorists who base their critique of liberal democracy mainly on 
aspects of socio-cultural difference (see e.g. Mouffe 1993, Pateman 1987, Tully 1995, Young 
2000). 
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the individual is a rational political actor motivated only by the ‘constraint-free 
force of the better argument’ (Habermas 1984: 28), whereas in fact, so critics 
argue, politics is a constant struggle for recognition against a background of 
cultural diversity and plurality. As difference democrats see it, to assume that 
consensus-oriented argument is the primary mode of politics is to suppress all 
individual and group identities that deviate from (Western, rationalistic) national 
identity—a view echoed in one of Meyer’s observations. The lack of a shared 
background-understanding, he explains, can constitute an insurmountable barrier 
to consensus. It may preclude articulation of the views and needs of ‘the other’ in 
the (rationalistic) language of established political discourse, with the result that 
the very recognition of others’ identities and interests fails from the outset. 
Meyer contends that Western societies are experiencing a ‘normalization of 
socio-cultural difference brought about by globalization’ (p. 3). In what follows 
here, I would like to examine this contention against the backdrop of the debate in 
democratic theory which I have just outlined. I will argue that increasing encounters 
with the cultural ‘other’ fundamentally affect both our understanding of 
democracy and the legitimacy of established nation-state democracies. Unlike 
difference democrats, I do not hold that deliberative democracy is devalued by the 
normalization of socio-cultural difference. Instead, so I believe, it offers us a 
vantage-point from which we can gain a better understanding of the ongoing 
transformations and the possible ways of coping with growing diversity in the 
political realm. To illustrate this, I will begin by describing some of the challenges 
which the growth in experience of socio-cultural difference is posing for national 
liberal democracies. I will then give a brief account of Jürgen Habermas’s theory of 
democracy, of the role played in it by consensus and sameness, and of the function 
it attributes to parliamentary discourse. My aim is to demonstrate that Habermas’s 
discourse-theory of democracy can fruitfully incorporate Meyer’s observation 
regarding the normalization of socio-cultural difference and, having done so, can 
offer us new ways of thinking about transnational democracy. 
Normalization of socio-cultural difference as a challenge to 
national liberal democracy 
The chief way in which the proliferation of encounters with the culturally 
different is challenging nationally integrated democracies—and, more generally, 
our understanding of democratic politics—is through its impact on the emotional 
cornerstone of political community: the idea of the nation. The effects of the 
normalization of socio-cultural difference are already visible: in some circles, such 
normalization breeds fear and a diffuse sense of insecurity in regard to immigrants 
and foreigners, leading to calls for renationalization; amongst growing numbers of 
people, however, the ongoing encounter with cultural others evokes not 
xenophobia but curiosity, not a fearful clinging to tradition but a celebration of 
difference. Socio-cultural difference prompts us to some extent to adopt a 
reflective stance towards our own political identity. One consequence of this is that 
demands relating to justice and equality, to redistributive policies and social 
security, no longer automatically cease at a national community’s borders—
whether these be external, in regard to the application of national policies to 
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neighbouring countries, or internal, in regard to the entitlements of non-national 
inhabitants. In other words, increasing socio-cultural difference also fuels 
processes of denationalization. And this denationalization is giving rise to one of 
the greatest challenges confronting democratic theory today—that of determining 
how our political framework must be adjusted as the nation loses its ideational 
power and our long-established democracies, founded as national entities, are 
increasingly faced with problems relating to inclusion and representation. 
In this context, the normalization of socio-cultural difference triggers a series of 
important questions about the nature and possibility of transnational democracy. 
This is a multi-faceted conundrum involving much more than the simple search for 
realistic ways of extending democracy beyond territorial borders. It implies 
subjecting a whole range of deeply entrenched political concepts to radical 
questioning: What do we mean by a citizen of a democracy? And who is entitled to 
be or become one? Does democracy depend on the state’s monopoly on the use of 
force, or are there other, horizontal, non-state forms of democracy (‘network’ 
democracies, as some call them)? And—most importantly for our purposes here—
how much sameness does democracy require? 
Views on this last question are being profoundly influenced by the slow but 
steady normalization of socio-cultural difference that is currently under way. By 
forcing us to reflect on the normative bases of our political communities, the 
proliferation in encounters with the cultural other in political life is eroding the as 
yet predominant notion that political community—particularly in its democratic 
permutation—is dependent on a pre-existent, pre-political (national) identity. The 
impact which this transformation is having is hard to overestimate, given that it 
changes the very basis of political integration. A degree of sameness is clearly 
required in every democracy: a minimum level of trust must exist if we are to view 
the other as enjoying the same rights as ourselves in the self-government of our 
political community (Preuss 1998). And yet if we accept Meyer’s prognosis, this 
commonality will in future cease to be regarded as a natural phenomenon or a 
given—something that the other has or has not, depending on the cultural 
community she belongs to. With the normalization of socio-cultural difference, pre-
political sameness is likely to fade away. As Meyer puts it (paraphrasing Stichweh), 
we will increasingly find ourselves in situations where we routinely ‘act under the 
presupposition of socio-cultural similarity only in interactions within our very close 
social network (family, friends), while in professional life, in organizations of any 
kind, and at public events, we will generally assume we are interacting with socio-
cultural strangers with whom we do not share even the most basic assumptions’ (p. 
5). If this proves to be the case, there will come a point when we no longer expect 
to encounter ‘our own kind’ in the political realm (assuming we ever did so in 
context of the nation-state). Instead, we shall expect, and be prepared for, 
inevitable encounter with ‘the other’, and this will undoubtedly have critical 
consequences for how we view the collective identity on which our political 
community is based. Rather than seeing this identity as a kind of mystical bond 
deriving from a shared history, language, culture, or ethnicity and transcending 
political cooperation, we shall regard it as something to be constantly re-created 
and renewed in the actual course of political cooperation, as the fruit of repeated 
attempts to reconcile the diverse, perhaps even contradictory, views of citizens 
who remain strangers. 
Commentary Gaus: The normalization of socio-cultural difference . . . 
 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 3 62 
	
What are the implications of this as regards thinking on transnational democracy? 
As I see it, Meyer’s diagnosis of a normalization of socio-cultural difference 
highlights two elements that are of major importance in identifying potential non-
national forms of democracy. On the one hand, it suggests that we need to rethink 
the kind of sameness that is requisite for democracy. On the other, it prompts us to 
review the role which parliamentary politics plays within a democracy: in a context 
of increasing socio-cultural difference, the role of a democratic parliament would 
no longer be confined to that of mirroring societal interests and aggregating these 
into law-giving majorities; parliamentary discourse would have a deeper, 
integrative function constitutive of democratic political communities. Drawing on 
Habermas’s theory of democracy, I will now explore these two elements in greater 
detail. 
Understanding in difference—the epistemic function of 
democracy 
A common interpretation of deliberative democratic theory takes the following 
form. Deliberative approaches, it is said, see democratic politics mainly as an 
exchange of arguments aimed chiefly at producing consensual decisions. The 
function of political discourse—and of parliamentary discourse in particular—is to 
filter out all non-generalizable particular interests, thus paving the way for 
decisions that are viewed by all as the best solution to a shared problem. In short, 
say these commentators, deliberative democrats model democratic politics as a 
collective quest for consensus driven by the ‘constraint-free force of the better 
argument’ (Habermas 1984: 28). 
Viewed in this light, there is no doubt that deliberative democratic theory is open 
to serious criticism—on three specific counts. In the first place—as difference 
democrats point out—the account it offers of democratic politics appears to be 
strongly culture-bound: the presumed existence of a rational individual always 
willing and able to put aside subjective interest and emotion for the sake of the 
generalizable common good would appear to anchor deliberative democratic 
theory firmly within Western Enlightenment traditions. Secondly, it views 
democratic politics through the utopian lens of an ‘ideal speech situation’ 
(Habermas) which can never be realized in practice and from which the very core of 
politics, namely its agonistic and pluralistic character (Mouffe 1999), is absent. 
Lastly, the presumed nature of politics as a quest for consensus presupposes a high 
degree of sameness, a strong collective identity. The reasons for this are twofold: 
only where there is a strong collective identity will citizens of a democracy be 
willing to relinquish their subjective interests in favour of the common good; and 
only where such citizens have a strong shared background will anything akin to a 
generalizable interest emerge in the first place (Scharpf 1999: 7–8). On this view, 
Meyer’s diagnosis of ever more frequent encounters with the cultural ‘other’ 
clearly poses a serious problem for a deliberative understanding of democracy. If 
democracy depends on a high degree of cultural sameness and a strong collective 
identity of a kind that only the nation has so far been able to provide, the 
normalization of socio-cultural difference will effectively undermine the conditions 
necessary for its existence. 
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This critique is in stark contrast to the view which Habermasian democratic theory 
takes of the relation between the nation and democracy. According to Habermas, 
the idea of the nation acted as a catalyst in the historical development of modern 
democracies. It sowed the seed of collective emotional attachment, a ‘we feeling’ 
that promoted consciousness of the equality of rights in regard to individual 
freedom and thus helped democratic self-rule gain a foothold amongst the broad 
mass of the population. In today’s democratic societies, however, democratic 
values are already more or less firmly entrenched. In this context, increasing socio-
cultural difference does not pose a threat to democracy; what it does, rather, is 
highlight the contradictions that exist—and have always existed—between 
democracy and the nation. From the perspective of deliberative democracy, the 
normalization of socio-cultural difference strengthens democratic claims for equal 
rights to individual self-determination (to each according to her own cultural 
background) and thus encourages movement beyond the rather artificial 
boundaries of existing national communities. This is not to say that nation-states 
are in the process of becoming meaningless or dissolving. It means, rather, that 
increasing experience of socio-cultural difference ‘activates’ the potentially 
universal reach of the values of democracy and prompts us to apply them to people 
beyond our ‘own’ national community. One likely consequence of this would seem 
to be a transformation in the perception of the nature of political community. In 
this sense, the normalization of socio-cultural difference opens up the sealed 
container of national identity and fosters new and complementary forms of 
transnational political attachment. 
But how do these assumptions about the universal reach of democracy stand up 
to the criticisms outlined above, according to which deliberative democracy, as a 
quest for consensus, is either hopelessly utopian or dependent on a ‘thick’ 
collective identity—on the idea of the nation? In my view, the key here lies in a 
correct understanding of the claims of deliberative democratic theory. By this I 
mean an understanding that refrains from viewing ideal speech situations, 
(political) discourse, and consensus as elements in a blueprint for an ideal 
democratic process. In contrast to such overly concrete interpretations—on which 
the above critique is mostly based—the discourse theory of democracy advanced 
by Habermas does not seek to provide a model for an ideal democracy. Instead, in 
its analysis of the development of modern democracy, it suggests that the norms 
inherent in that democracy to some degree mirror fundamental features of social 
cooperation. 
Most importantly for our purposes, it is not the case that deliberative democracy 
simply assumes that democratic politics is a quest for consensus or that the 
function of parliamentary discourse is to filter out non-generalizable interests. 
Rather, the concept of consensus (in the sense of an ideal speech situation2) has its 
place in an explication of what Habermas assumes to be basic features of language-
mediated cooperation. In this context, it is not consensus itself, as a product of 
cooperation, that is of greatest relevance, but orientation towards reaching it—or, 
more precisely, reaching a common understanding. The deliberative element in 
deliberative democratic theory rests on the assumption that social cooperation 
(and thus also political cooperation) depends on language-based interaction in 
																																																								
2   Given the space constraints here, discussion of the concept of the ideal speech situation must 
be left for another occasion. 
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which the participants ultimately have no other choice than to try to reach a 
common understanding via an exchange of perspectives. This stance draws on 
pragmatic philosophy and its account of how we cope with the material and social 
world. The basic assumption here is that when ego and alter encounter a problem 
they cannot deal with individually, and for which established routines offer no way 
through, their ability to find, or rather create, a new solution depends on their 
exchanging perspectives with a view to reaching a common understanding as to 
how to do this. Note that this account of cooperation does not presuppose an 
extensive shared background. Although a degree of shared background is 
necessary, it is actually the lack of it, in the context of a new and unforeseen 
situation, that makes orientation to reaching a common understanding a functional 
necessity and thus unavoidable for cooperation in the first place. 
Seen in this light, consensus, in the sense of a coming-to-terms with each other 
based on a sufficient overlap of existing convictions, is a secondary concern in 
Habermasian deliberative democracy. Rather, the assumption of an intrinsic 
individual orientation towards reaching a common understanding—the ‘telos’ of 
communication—relates to the creative element inherent in, and constitutive of, 
language-mediated world-disclosure or social cooperation. Such an orientation is, 
so to speak, the (only) basic tool available to humans, as societal animals, to cope 
with the new and the unknown—whether this be a puzzling new natural 
phenomenon or an encounter with the cultural ‘other’. 
We are now in a better position to appreciate how Meyer’s diagnosis of a 
normalization of socio-cultural difference intermeshes with the assumptions 
underlying deliberative democratic theory. Deliberative democratic theory views 
the institutions of democracy as mechanisms for the exercise of stabilized societal 
cooperation in as peaceful and just a way as possible. On this view, democratic 
politics is a routinized and stabilized way of coping with the new and the unknown 
on a broad, societal scale. Having a strong shared background does not appear to 
be a necessary condition of democratic cooperation. The decisive condition, rather, 
is the weaker one of shared perception of a common problem and trust that the 
other is willing to engage peacefully in joint problem-solving. Where such a 
condition pertains, even if there is strong cultural divergence and no common 
background, repeated interaction on the basis of a shared concern to arrive at an 
understanding will result in the gradual build-up of shared background knowledge. 
In Meyer’s terms: ‘[T]he temporal-sequential and bodily structures that humans 
share existentially appear to provide a common ground for interaction under 
conditions of socio-cultural difference’ (p. 17) and ‘in the course of repeated 
interaction, stocks of knowledge become more and more inclusive, flexible, and—
eventually—cosmopolitical (in other words sensitive to, and competent in regard 
to, socio-cultural alterity)’ (p. 14). 
Ideally, I should here cite further evidence in support of these far-reaching 
assertions, but considerations of space preclude an account of the Habermasian 
chain of argument linking the analysis of language-based cooperation and the 
institutions of modern democracy.3 I will therefore confine myself to a few brief 
remarks about one other aspect relevant to Meyer’s thesis of a normalization of 
socio-cultural difference and the prospects for transnational democracy. 
																																																								
3   For a more detailed account, see Gaus (2009). 
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The shift in perspective implied in the deliberative account of democracy crucially 
affects our understanding of the function of parliaments in democratic politics. 
According to a widely held view in political science, democratic parliaments are 
places where the full range of societal interests are promoted by representatives 
of the people. In this scheme of things, the main aim of parliamentary politics is to 
aggregate these interests into governing majorities, thus enabling the very 
functioning of the political community. This voluntaristic understanding of 
parliamentary democracy doubtless has a place in the overall scheme of things, but 
the deliberative account stresses another, more epistemic—and often neglected—
side of parliamentary politics. This relates not to the elimination of non-
generalizable interests through parliamentary discourse, but to what might be 
viewed as the heuristic function of public deliberation as conducted in and around 
parliamentary politics. Even within a nation-state democracy—in other words, 
where there is a strong national identity—the view that parliamentary politics is 
concerned chiefly with the aggregation of given societal interests into majorities 
neglects the crucial function which such political activity has in dealing with the 
ethical and moral issues associated with policy decisions. In such cases, the 
parliamentary process serves the function of facilitating an exchange of views, with 
the initial aim of establishing a common understanding of what is at stake, who is 
concerned, why they are concerned, and how. Clearly, these two functions—
aggregation to form governing majorities and the attainment of common 
understanding via a public exchange of views—are in a state of some tension vis-à-
vis one another. It may reasonably be assumed that for major redistributive issues, 
a stronger form of ‘we identity’ is needed than the one suggested above (Scharpf 
1999). That said, a democratic parliament also (and perhaps more importantly) 
functions as the institutionalized societal space within which the common 
standpoint of the political community is repeatedly established and then subjected 
to challenge, in a process of open deliberation. Democratic politics does not 
presuppose a high degree of sameness here. On the contrary, a democratic 
parliament may be seen as an institutionalized public meeting-place where a shared 
background, rather than being a precondition for mutual dealings, actually grows 
out of repeated interaction and exchange between societal views that either 
simply conflict or else are culturally alien to one another. 
Conclusion 
My aim in this brief response has been to show how a future ‘normalization of 
socio-cultural difference’, as posited by Christian Meyer, might be conducive to the 
development of new forms of transnational democracy. In an interpretation of the 
Habermasian approach that runs counter to the widespread criticism of 
deliberative democracy, I have suggested that democratic politics should be viewed 
not simply as a struggle for majority but also as driven by an over-arching logic of 
understanding across difference. 
Such a view allows us to see democratic parliaments as public meeting-places 
where diverse, contradictory, and even culturally alien societal views can encounter 
one another. In this scheme of things, the function of democratic parliamentary 
politics (or at least one of its functions) is to serve as a forum for encounters with 
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the other, for the exchange of perspectives, and for the raising of awareness in 
regard to the expectations and needs of others—all as a means of reaching a 
shared standpoint on the particular problem to be solved and the possible ways of 
solving it.  
Clearly, if transnational policies were based purely on transnational majority-
decisions, the absence of a common identity would present a major challenge in 
terms of garnering the requisite public support. However, even under conditions of 
socio-cultural difference, the heuristic function of a democratic parliament could 
produce an integrative effect. In a forum such as a transnational—or indeed 
global—parliament, the endeavour to secure mutual recognition is likely to result 
in the creation of precisely the kinds of inclusive, flexible, and ultimately 
cosmopolitan stocks of shared knowledge described by Christian Meyer. 
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On Human´s Adjustability to ‘Alterity’ – Can 
Global Cooperation within a World Society 
Be Successful? 
 
 
Commentary by Dirk Messner 
 
 
The Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research (KHK/GCR) 
researches the possibilities and limits of global cooperation in a developing world 
society. Without a new quality of cross-border cooperation, the growing global 
interdependencies will change into global risks. One of the great challenges of the 
21st century will be in inventing institutions and ways of proceeding to stabilise the 
global commons and to sustainably administer or organise them. This holds for the 
climate system as well as other sub-systems of the Earth system, the international 
financial markets, global infrastructures (such as the Internet and other 
communications networks, traffic systems) the world economy depends on, as well 
as for an international political system providing for peace, security and a way of 
living together which is based on rules. To make global cooperation happen, 
mankind must learn to understand itself as a (risk) community with a common 
responsibility for the maintaining of the global commons. Thus, the success of 
global cooperation depends not only on interest and power structures but also on 
man´s and the societies´ capability to produce social innovations favouring 
cooperation and social interaction at a worldwide scale. The creation of a culture of 
global cooperation means a new stage of the development of civilization in the 
history of mankind.  
In the context of many national states and – to limited extent – in the context of 
the European Union, densely woven social infrastructures which favour 
cooperation (such as we-identities, shared normative and cognitive role models, 
grown cultural understandings, common institutions which are perceived as being 
legitimate) have developed. At the level of developing world society these ‘densely 
woven cooperation cultures’ are confronted by ‘fragile and thinly woven 
cooperation cultures’. Can humankind be successful, under conditions of ‘cultural 
hybridity’, much ‘alienness’ and ‘alterity’ among the almost 200 national states and 
given the sheer complexity of cross-border social networks, with developing 
patterns of global cooperation to govern globalisation? This question is even more 
urgent as, coming along with globalisation growing ever faster, the western 
predominance over the international system which consisted since the Industrial 
Revolution seems to come to an end. ‘The West’ will have to learn how to 
appropriately acknowledge the points of view, interests, role models, cultural 
identities and historical experiences of non-western countries if worldwide 
cooperation is to have a chance. Within a post-western world order actors who 
often do not know much about each other and have only little experience with 
cooperation on an equal footing must establish cooperative relationships.  
Thus, the question about the possibilities and limits of global cooperation also 
means asking about if and how soon humans are able to adjust to radically changed 
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conditions. Will cultural diversity, the multi-levelled differences of non-western 
actors, the social complexity of worldwide networks within which the most 
different interests, role models, systems of norms, values and rules encounter each 
other, prevent man from driving on global cooperation in a developing world 
society? By globalisation, are we coming to the social limits of human´s ability to 
cooperate? 
Of course, Christian Meyer is not able to give a final answer to these fundamental 
questions. But his work does change our view at the basic conditions of social 
interaction for the development of global cooperation structures. Apart from 
globalisation, which forces humans to get along with each other within 
internationalised contexts or even to jointly solve problems, Christian Meyer 
researches two other mega-trends which will result in far-reaching changes of the 
social interaction between humans: the growing number of people suffering from 
dementia in many societies as well as the growing significance of artificial 
intelligence in modern societies. Christian Meyer believes us humans to be capable 
of coping with all three challenges. The historical, social-psychological, sociological 
and anthropological arguments on which he bases his optimism are multi-levelled 
and worth considering. Already the fact that these three trends are compared to 
each other comes as a surprise! 
The insight drawn from Christian Meyer´s considerations – surprising from the 
point of view of cooperation research – is: it may well be that dealing with a 
growing number of people suffering from dementia as well as human´s interaction 
or even melting to one with various kinds of artificial intelligence will confront 
individuals and human societies with much bigger challenges than the interaction 
of people and attempted cooperation between actors within delimited, globalised 
spaces. Given the dementia problem, which is of growing significance in many 
societies, and given the phenomenon of artificial intelligence, in Christian Meyer´s 
view the challenges man is confronted with when dealing with ‘alterity’ within 
global cooperation networks are less significant. If we share Christian Meyer´s 
optimism regarding human´s adjustability and capability of social learning, it should 
be possible to successively develop the social infrastructures and foundations of 
global cooperation. If we do not share his optimism, the parallelity of globalisation, 
increasing dementia and growing significance of artificial intelligence might bring 
rough times for humankind and might result in dangerous processes of social 
disintegration. 
Thus, why is it that dementia and artificial intelligence as well as human´s ability 
to deal with alterity are a bigger challenge to mankind than cooperation within 
delimited spaces? Meyer is supplied with convincing arguments: in 2060 may be up 
to 5% of Germany´s population will suffer from dementia. Society would have to 
learn how to integrate a great number of people who have lost essential 
characteristics of grown-up humans: cognitive skills, memory, social skills when it 
comes to dealing with other people, ability to self-determination. From this there 
result fundamental questions: which rights will this large group have? How could 
we learn to deal in a dignified way with people we know or even with those we are 
not familiar with who have lost essential elements of what makes us human? Will 
we have to newly define ‘being human’? How will it be possible to avoid 
marginalisation and discrimination? Much suggests that it might be easier to 
initiate social interaction between people from India, Ghana, Germany and Uruguay 
in the context of trans-national networks than social interaction between people 
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suffering from dementia and ‘healthy people’ in Germany. In such cases, ‘alterity’ 
may be much more insignificant in trans-national contexts than within local spaces.  
In 2001, 17 million services robots worldwide were employed in households, at 
hospitals and enterprises. Until 2015 another 26 million of these machines, 
equipped with artificial intelligence, are supposed to be employed in public and 
private services as well as in education. Furthermore, there is a trend of implanting 
computers for the optimisation or healing of humans into the latter. Possibly, in the 
future the brains of people suffering from dementia may be changed by way of 
computer chips. It might be that human and artificial intelligence will form an 
immediate symbiotic relationship. The governments of Japan and South Korea are 
working on programmes for a ‘human-robot coexistence society’. How will man, 
his/her way of thinking and acting be changed by artificial intelligence? Which kinds 
of artificial intelligence will man accept in which fields of society or not? Will 
artificial intelligence be easier accepted if it appears as human as possible, or is it 
just the other way round, will it more easily be accepted if its alterity compared to 
man stays obvious? How far will man drive the melting into one of brains and 
computers, and for which purposes? What would that mean for our understanding 
of being human, of human dignity, of our idea of the equality of man? There are no 
historical models for such a world. It might be that humankind will create a new age 
with ‘human-machines’ or ‘machine-humans’ coexisting with ‘natural humans’. 
Against this background, the demand of creating cooperation within globalised 
spaces and networks looks less spectacular. After all, it is ‘only’ about ‘scale’, about 
new degrees of human interaction; the respective basic patterns of social 
complexity resulting from globalisation have long been known to man. Since the 
Neolithic Revolution humans have learned how to get along within ever larger and 
more heterogeneous groups (from small groups or villages as far as to large 
national states and international organisations), with cultural diversity and alterity 
as well as with new role models, values and ever more complex interests. The 
history of human civilization and the history of the development of cooperative 
relationships between humans is a history of the increase of social complexity – 
temporary setbacks (e. g. as a result of war) are not at all ruled out in this context. 
And what is to stop man from continuing or, so to speak, ‘completing’ this process, 
now in the context of unfolding world society? Or will the new ‘quantity’ of social 
complexity in a globalised world turn into a new quality which might overtax man? 
Christian Meyer does not find any indication for the latter. 
We need not necessarily agree with Christian Meyer´s conclusions, however in 
any case his arguments are worth considering. Furthermore, two of Meyer´s 
observations and hints regarding man´s dealing with ‘alterity’ are of interest, no 
matter if it is about globalisation dynamics, dementia or artificial intelligence. 
Firstly: the easiest way for humans to learn how to cope with ‘alterity’ and 
‘alienness’ is simply to deal with them. Common values, rules, perceptions as well 
as new, sustainable, peaceful patterns of interaction and cooperation do not first 
of all develop ‘in the laboratory’, ‘at the desk’, in the context of academic debating 
but by those ‘being different’ dealing with each other. Concerning global 
cooperation this means: for us humans the easiest way to learn how to cooperate is 
cooperation. The social infrastructure of cooperation develops successively. The 
essential mechanisms of cooperation (Messner, Guarín and Haun 2013) cannot be 
created in real time, they must be ‘made’ by way of human acting. 
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Secondly: concerning all three cases discussed by Meyer, a prudent way of dealing 
with alterity requires a kind of man who is not characterized by narrow rationality, 
cognitive skills and utilitarianism. Both when it comes to dealing with dementia and 
with artificial intelligence as well as with human interaction within globalised 
spaces, humanity, empathy, human sympathy gain significance. People suffering 
from dementia, who have lost their cognitive skills, may well be approached by way 
of emotions, human sympathy and compassion. When it comes to dealing with 
artificial intelligence, humans must clarify, beyond man´s cognitive skills, what is 
‘human’ and how this core of humanity could be protected. When considering the 
basic difference between man and highly intelligent computer systems, we think of 
social skills such as empathy, humanity, emotion. The interaction of humans within 
globalised spaces may be affected by different value systems, historical 
experiences or social role models. Referring to the fundamental common grounds 
of all people of developing world society (human dignity, compassion, emotion, 
capability of empathy) may be helpful when it comes to dealing with the various 
kinds of ‘alterity’. In the past few decades the social sciences have been dominated 
by approaches which were characterized by a narrow concept of man, while 
ignoring or hardly mentioning these social skills. According to Christian Meyer, the 
utilisation-maximising individuals of rational choice theory or homo economicus of 
neo-classical economics may be supposed to be completely overtaxed by the social 
challenges of globalisation, dementia and artificial intelligence. 
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